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1  introDuction
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) constitutes one of the most significant 
medical innovations of the last two decades in the area of assisted reproductive 
technology. The information derived from the genetic analysis of cells aspirated from 
an embryo created by in vitro fertilisation (IVF) may be used for diverse purposes, 
all of which may influence the decision as to which embryos should be implanted, 
and which discarded. With the introduction of the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (HART) Act 2004, the performance of PGD is now subject to legislative 
and regulatory restraint. The purpose of this report is to consider extensions to the 
current scope of permissible PGD in New Zealand, and to determine the effect of the 
HART Act 2004 provisions on decision-making in this area.
PGD was first performed to determine the sex of embryos at risk of inheriting 
an X-linked condition. As the technology has become more sophisticated, it has 
become possible to determine the precise location of many genetic mutations and 
to develop genetic tests capable of diagnosing the presence of such mutations. 
At its simplest, PGD provides an opportunity for parents and clinicians to avoid 
the birth of a child who may be seriously impaired as a result of a familial single 
gene or familial chromosomal disorder. This category of PGD has been declared 
an ‘established procedure’ under the HART Act 2004 and may be carried out as a 
routine clinical procedure.1 PGD may also be used to screen embryos for numerical 
chromosomal abnormalities in the case of women who are of advanced reproductive 
age or who have had recurrent implantation failures or miscarriages. This category 
of PGD, which has also been declared to be an established procedure, permits the 
negative selection of embryos with chromosomal abnormalities which may threaten 
successful implantation and gestation. This type of PGD, commonly referred to 
as aneuploidy screening, constitutes the greatest demand for PGD and has largely 
escaped controversy.2 Prospective parents undergoing aneuploidy screening are 
simply trying to achieve a successful pregnancy and birth, rather than selecting 
against, or in favour of, a particular trait. 
Beyond PGD simpliciter, PGD may be utilised for a multiplicity of purposes. For 
example, it may be performed to determine whether an embryo possesses the 
same tissue type as an existing sibling in need of a stem cell transplant. This latter 
application of PGD has stimulated vigorous international debate, particularly where 
the prospective embryos are not at risk of inheriting a genetic disorder. Testing 
for disorders which confer susceptibility, rather than a certainty, of developing a 
genetically-based condition is another example of an extended application of PGD. 
It too has engendered significant discussion because an individual may never develop 
the particular disorder or, even if they do, may live many years before the disorder 
becomes apparent. PGD can also reveal not only whether an embryo has a particular 
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genetic mutation which will manifest in disease, but also whether the embryo is a 
healthy carrier of the mutation. Healthy carriers of a familial mutation do not, with 
some exceptions, have any physical manifestation of the disorder, but may transmit 
the genetic disorder to the next generation. Hence, selection against healthy carrier 
embryos is controversial because it eliminates healthy embryos rather than embryos 
which would result in an affected child.
The advent of preimplantation genetic haplotyping (PGH) signals a further scientific 
advance in the area of preimplantation genetic testing. The procedure is reportedly 
more accurate than PGD. Significantly, PGH does not require that the precise details 
of a genetic mutation are known in advance. All that is required is knowledge of the 
region on a particular chromosome associated with a specific genetic mutation which 
results in a genetic disorder. With the introduction of PGH the number of single gene 
disorders that may be detected at the preimplantation stage has multiplied. In some 
instances, it is possible to distinguish embryos which are healthy carriers of a defective 
gene where it was previously not possible. In the case of a disorder such as Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy, an X-linked recessive disorder, PGD currently requires selection 
against all male embryos. With PGH, it is possible to determine which of the male 
embryos are affected and which are not. This in turn increases the number of embryos 
suitable for transfer and the success rate of a PGH cycle.3 PGH can also distinguish 
which female embryos are healthy carrier embryos of the mutation and which are 
healthy non-carriers.4 In the future whole genome screening, which could provide 
a complete genetic profile with the use of microarray technology, may be possible 
if current technical problems can be overcome.5 Progress in this area will provide 
significantly more scope for choosing embryos based on genetic characteristics.
The provision of PGD in New Zealand is still in its infancy, the first cycle only being 
performed towards the end of 2005.6 The HART Act 2004, the Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (HART) Order 2005 and the Guidelines on Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis (2005) have established the lawful parameters of this relatively new 
medical technology. An in-depth analysis of these regulatory initiatives was undertaken 
in a prior report.7 The current regulatory framework is, in some respects, conservative 
in comparison to some other common law jurisdictions.8 The only applications of 
PGD permitted in New Zealand are strictly therapeutic, as understood in the narrow 
sense of the term, and they may only be undertaken to prevent the transmission of 
serious genetic disorders. The regulatory regime reflects an approach that permits 
PGD in the least controversial circumstances when it is generally perceived to be a 
medical imperative. However the current regulatory framework for PGD is not static. 
Regulatory mechanisms exist which enable the statutory Advisory Committee on 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ACART) to restrict, or extend, the boundaries of 
PGD in New Zealand. 
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In view of developments in science and in other jurisdictions, it is likely that there will 
be a demand to extend the current ambit of the regulatory framework. Extending, or 
refusing to extend the current parameters for PGD will require a clear articulation of 
how the principles declared in the HART Act 2004 which govern decision-making in 
this area are to be applied.9 
This report examines the conducting of PGD in areas which would broaden the 
existing regulatory scheme. In the following section an analysis of the HART Act 
2004, and in particular the purposes and principles of the Act, will be undertaken 
to provide a foundation for the substantive examination of expansions to PGD in 
the following sections. The expansions discussed in sections 3 and 4 involve human 
leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing and negative selection of healthy carrier 
embryos, respectively. In a field of rapid scientific progress, the last section in this 
report provides an update regarding the most recent development in the field of 
PGD: preimplantation genetic haplotyping (PGH). 
2  human assisteD reProDuctive technology act 200
2.1  introduction
It has been observed that the extent to which the use of genetic technology is 
determined by Parliament reflects the underlying public health and social policy 
agenda of a particular government.10 The introduction of the HART Act 2004 has 
signalled that human assisted reproduction is no longer an area of medicine regulated 
simply by professional self-regulation and the applicable general medical law; instead, 
it is now subject to a specific legislative scheme. 
This report will argue that, with the establishment of the HART Act 2004, the New 
Zealand Government has established a mid-ground philosophy which on the one 
hand eschews radical reproductive liberty but on the other seeks to secure the benefits 
of assisted reproductive technology for ‘individuals and for society in general’ within 
a protective framework. Arguably, Parliament has opted for a flexible regime which 
may keep pace with progress and which requires dialogue with the public, whilst 
prohibiting what are deemed to be ‘unacceptable’ procedures or research. However, 
it is argued in this report that the objectives and purposes of the Act still support 
a presumption of reproductive liberty as the starting point when determining the 
appropriate parameters of assisted reproductive procedures such as PGD.
A brief outline of the current regulatory framework will be provided. However, 
the focus of this section is an analysis of the relevant purposes, principles and 
corresponding duties contained in the HART Act 2004, before the report moves on 
to consider expansions to the current regulatory framework for PGD in sections 3 
and 4. 
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2.2  current regulatory Framework – the act, the order and the guidelines
The HART Act 2004 establishes certain prohibitions such as the ban on reproductive 
cloning and germline genetic modification. In all other respects, the role of determining 
and advising what restrictions should be imposed on the use of reproductive genetic 
technology, in particular PGD, has been delegated to the statutory advisory body 
created under the Act, ACART. 
The Act creates three categories of assisted reproductive procedures. The first 
encompasses procedures which are statutorily prohibited, such as PGD for social 
sex selection.11 The second category comprises procedures which are regulated and 
require the approval of the Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(ECART) in accordance with guidelines formulated by ACART before they may be 
performed.12 The third category constitutes activities which have been declared by 
Order in Council to be established procedures.13 Established procedures are routine 
clinical procedures that may be carried out without external scrutiny. 
The Act provides no express guidance in relation to PGD with one exception. The 
conducting of PGD to diagnose and select on the grounds of sex in the absence of 
an X-linked condition is prohibited.14 This is a clear indication from Parliament that 
PGD should not extend to the selection of nondisease-related traits. 
HLA tissue typing is currently a regulated procedure under the Act and applications 
may only be approved by ECART in accordance with the Guidelines on Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis.15 HLA tissue typing to enable the selection of an embryo which has 
a compatible tissue type with an existing sick sibling in need of a stem cell transplant 
is permitted on a case-by-case basis according to specified criteria. However 
performing tissue typing is prohibited unless the embryos are at risk of inheriting a 
genetic disorder for which there is a test available. 
PGD for familial single gene disorders, familial sex-linked disorders and familial 
chromosomal and non-familial chromosomal disorders in restricted circumstances 
are currently established procedures under the provisions of the HART Order 2005.16 
Selection against healthy carrier embryos was not considered in the public consultation 
on PGD prior to the drafting of the PGD Guidelines, and is not expressly referred to in 
the HART Order 2005.17 Consequently it is unclear whether selection against healthy 
carrier embryos is permitted as a routine procedure under the Order. 
It has been argued elsewhere that performing PGD for late-onset susceptibility 
disorders is permitted under the current established procedures category, although 
this does not appear to have been intentional on the part of the policy-makers.18 
Whilst the merits of permitting PGD for susceptibility disorders has not been 
debated in New Zealand, the wording of the established procedures order appears 
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to be sufficiently broad to encompass PGD for lower-penetrance disorders as an 
established procedure.
As already indicated, this analysis is concerned with extensions to the regulatory 
framework in the areas of HLA tissue typing and selection against unaffected carrier 
embryos. However, a substantive analysis of these issues cannot be undertaken 
without first addressing the implications of the HART Act 2004. Consequently, the 
report now examines the objectives and purposes of the Act, and the duties imposed 
by the principles declared in the Act. 
2.  the purposes and the principles
Section 3 of the HART Act 2004 articulates six distinct purposes. Additionally, a set 
of principles is provided which must guide persons exercising powers or performing 
functions under the Act if relevant to the particular power or function being exercised. 
Taken together, these objectives and principles do not overtly reveal an underlying 
principle or approach which is to be applied to human assisted reproductive 
technology. To distil an overriding principle necessitates careful dissection of the 
relevant purposes and principles of the Act. 
Section 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999 states that ‘the meaning of an enactment 
must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose’. The objectives of the 
HART Act 2004 may be condensed down to four main themes.19 The first is to secure 
the benefits of assisted reproductive technology and research within a framework 
which protects and promotes the ‘health, safety, dignity and rights of all individuals’, 
particularly those of women and children, in the use of such technologies (s 3(a)).20 
The second is to prohibit ‘unacceptable’ assisted reproductive procedures and research 
including certain commercial transactions relating to human reproduction such as 
the sale of human embryos or gametes (ss 3(b) and 3(c)). The third is to establish 
a flexible regulatory framework which delegates policy-making and regulatory 
authority to the two statutory bodies, ACART and ECART (ss 3(d), 3(e), 32, and 35). 
The fourth objective is to establish an information-keeping regime to ensure that 
people born from donated embryos or cells can find out about their genetic origins 
(s 3(f)). It is the first objective with which this analysis is concerned.
As already observed, the New Zealand Parliament has conferred on ACART the 
authority to determine and provide advice as to what constitutes permissible assisted 
reproductive procedures in New Zealand. When regulating contentious issues it is 
helpful, and often necessary, to adopt an overarching principle or set of principles 
that informs and supports the conclusions reached. Section 4 of the HART Act 2004 
provides seven principles which must guide all persons (which implicitly includes 
ACART and ECART) who are exercising relevant powers or performing relevant 
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functions under the Act. (Emphasis added.) The principles relevant to this discussion 
are as follows:
(a) the health and well-being of children born as a result of the performance of 
an assisted reproductive procedure or an established procedure should be an 
important consideration in all decisions about that procedure:
(b) the human health, safety, and dignity of present and future generations should 
be preserved and promoted:
(c) while all persons are affected by assisted reproductive procedures and 
established procedures, women, more than men, are directly and significantly 
affected by their application, and the health and well-being of women must be 
protected in the use of these procedures:
(d) no assisted reproductive procedure should be performed on an individual and 
no human reproductive research should be conducted on an individual unless 
the individual has made an informed choice and given informed consent
  …
(e) the needs, values, and beliefs of Maori should be considered and treated with 
respect:
(f) the different ethical, spiritual, and cultural perspectives in society should be 
considered and treated with respect. 
(Emphasis added.)
The principles apply to the full range of human assisted reproductive procedures 
and human reproductive research. The legislation encompasses activities such as 
human embryonic research, human cloning, the supply of embryos and gametes, 
and other related activities, so the principles are necessarily generic. Whilst these 
principles are intended to provide guidance for policy-makers, their generic nature 
means that their application to a particular issue may support a variety of outcomes. 
When considering the legitimacy of the current regulatory restraints on PGD, and 
extensions to the framework, an in-depth analysis of the first purpose and the 
principles contained in the Act is necessary. 
2.3.1  The first purpose – Whose dignity and what rights?
The first purpose of the Act refers to securing the benefits of assisted reproduction 
for individuals and for society in general by taking appropriate measures to protect 




 This Act has the following purposes:
 (a) to secure the benefits of assisted reproductive procedures, established   
 procedures, and human reproductive research for individuals and   
 for society in general by taking appropriate measures for the    
 protection and promotion of the health, safety, dignity, and rights   
 of all individuals, but particularly those of women and children, in  
 the use of these procedures and research. 
Whilst the concept of health and safety are self-explanatory, the concepts of ‘dignity’ 
and ‘rights’ beg closer analysis. Both of these are explored in greater detail before 
attention is turned to the principles provided in the Act.
2.3.1.1  Dignity
The promotion and protection of human dignity is a stalwart principle in international 
instruments as a criterion for guiding policy-making in the area of human rights 
as well as that of controversial scientific advances.21 This trend to incorporate the 
principle of human dignity into legislative instruments is evident in the HART Act 
2004; but it is not defined, nor is it clear how it is to be applied.
The traditional human rights informed view of human dignity ascribes to the 
inherent worth of an individual, recognising a right to individual autonomy and 
the right to self-determination.22 Whilst autonomy is taken by many to be a core 
component of the concept of dignity, a broader concept of human dignity has been 
articulated by Justice Iacobucci of the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. 
It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment.23
The problem with the concept of human dignity is the inherent difficulty in 
determining what it is and how respect for human dignity is best achieved. Human 
dignity is an amorphous concept, which changes according to the diverse perspectives 
held by various groups in society.24 It is difficult to attribute a precise meaning to 
the concept even in the particular context of the HART Act 2004. Dignity may be 
invoked to justify alternative sides of the same argument. For example, some would 
argue that to select an embryo on the basis of defined genetic characteristics is an 
inappropriate instrumentalisation and an affront to the prospective child’s dignity. 
Others may counter that to arbitrarily restrict parents from making decisions which 
they perceive would enhance the quality of life of their child and family is an affront 
to their personal dignity and autonomy.
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It has been claimed that, in the light of new genetic technologies, human dignity is 
increasingly used ‘as a form of general condemnation and as blanket justification for 
regulatory restraint’.25 The use of human dignity as a criterion for policy-making has 
been described by at least one commentator as a ‘useless concept’26 and its relevance 
in bioethical discourse has been questioned.27 It has been argued that often 
the use of human dignity seems to amount to little more than an articulation of 
a general social unease with a given technology.28
Whilst human dignity may support the right of an individual to make autonomous 
choices, dignity may also be used as a means of restraint. In this latter context, the 
use of dignity as a criterion is ‘meant to reflect a broad social or moral position that 
a particular type of activity is contrary to public morality or the collective good’.29 
The result is that an undefined notion of human dignity may determine whether a 
particular scientific activity is acceptable depending on whether it offends human 
dignity, rather than on the basis of tangible harms that may result from it.30 It is 
generally conceded that although the concept of human dignity is of great importance, 
it is not helpful as a sole guiding principle when determining the appropriate scope 
of reprogenetic technology. As one commentator observed:
… it is something of a loose cannon, open to abuse and misinterpretation; it 
can oversimplify complex questions; and it can encourage a paternalism that is 
incompatible with the spirit of self-determination that informs the mainstream 
of human rights thinking.31
Although the concept of respect for human dignity has been described as 
‘comprehensively vague’,32 most consider that it has a place in discussions involving 
new genetic technologies.33 It has been observed that the idea of human dignity 
may be of greatest assistance when it is used as a vehicle for exploring differing 
philosophical approaches in a pluralistic society.34 Such an approach considers the 
different values held and deemed important by different individuals or groups, and 
essentially involves having respect for others. It is argued here that, when considering 
the performance of assisted reproductive procedures under the HART Act 2004, 
competing claims based on dignity must be fully articulated and weighed against the 
relevant interests at stake or by reference to an overriding principle. 
2.3.1.2  Reproductive rights
As already indicated, the first purpose declared in the HART Act 2004 is to secure 
the benefits of assisted reproductive technology for individuals and society by taking 
measures to protect and promote the ‘rights of all individuals’ in the use of assisted 
reproduction. The Act does not elaborate on the nature of applicable rights. Arguably 
a highly relevant right in this context is the claimed right to reproductive liberty. 
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However, it is not sufficient to simply assert that reproductive liberty is preserved 
under the Act without an analysis of the basis of the right and whether it is applicable 
to assisted reproduction. 
One of the political characteristics of a liberal democracy is the philosophy that 
citizens should be free to conduct their lives without interference by the State unless 
such interference is necessary to avoid harm to others.35 This principle effectively 
means that individuals ‘should be free to make their own choices in the light of their 
own values whether or not these are acceptable to the majority’, unless there is an 
adequate justification for the State to intervene.36 
The liberal democratic presumption encompasses two central elements, autonomy 
and liberty. Respect for autonomy is premised on the idea that an individual’s 
best interests are generally best served by allowing a person to make autonomous 
decisions; and individuals are assumed to be able to judge, better than anyone else, 
what constitutes their own interests.37 Autonomy requires not only ‘independence 
from controlling influences’, but also the ‘capacity for intentional action’.38
It stands to reason that when an individual’s liberty is curbed, so too is that person’s 
autonomy and, potentially, the capacity to further their relevant interests.39 This is 
generally perceived to constitute a ‘harm’, and is the basis for the harm principle 
articulated by the American philosopher Joel Feinberg. The harm principle 
provides that 
state interference with a citizen’s behaviour tends to be morally justified when it 
is reasonably necessary … to prevent harm or the unreasonable risk of harm to 
parties other than the person interfered with.40 
Given the liberal presumption, it has been argued that the burden of justifying 
restrictions on liberty is placed on ‘those who would deny liberty, not on those who 
would exercise it’.41 The concept of reproductive liberty is subsumed within the liberal 
democratic presumption.
The basis of reproductive liberty, which had its genesis in the reproductive rights 
movement of the twentieth century, is the right claimed by women to control 
their reproductive capacities and to make reproductive choices.42 The right to 
reproductive liberty was asserted as the moral justification for permitting access to 
lawful termination of pregnancy in the abortion debates of the mid 1900s. The right 
to reproductive liberty was established as a legal right with the acknowledgment by 
the legislature of a woman’s right to a lawful abortion.43 In the context of abortion, 
reproductive liberty in a liberal, rights-based society has been acknowledged as a 
basic freedom.44 
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Reproductive liberty is a facet of both the liberal democratic presumption and liberty 
in general. The overlap between reproductive liberty, human dignity and democracy 
is illustrated in the following words of Dworkin:
The right of procreative autonomy has an important place … in Western political 
culture … The most important feature of that culture is a belief in individual 
human dignity: that people have the moral right – and the moral responsibility 
– to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of 
their own lives for themselves, answering to their own consciences and convictions 
… The principle of procreative autonomy, in a broad sense, is embedded in any 
genuinely democratic culture.45
Although the principle of reproductive liberty has been established in the context of 
abortion and the right to choose, closer analysis is required to determine whether it 
is automatically applicable to assisted reproductive technology. Reproductive liberty 
is generally accepted as a negative right against interference by the state or others 
with regard to reproductive decisions. In the modern context, reproductive liberty 
has been used as a moral argument in favour of permitting the use of reprogenetic 
technologies to assist parents to have ‘healthy, biologically related offspring’.46 It 
is argued that the right in a liberal democratic society to reproductive liberty is 
applicable to the performance of assisted reproductive procedures such as PGD, 
and is implicitly adopted in the purpose declared in section 3(a) of the Act. Before 
addressing this latter issue, the nature of the right to reproductive liberty established 
in relation to abortion is first considered.
Although reproductive liberty has been recognised as an important freedom, which 
provides a strong argument in favour of a woman’s right to choose whether or not 
to continue a pregnancy, it is not absolute. In the context of abortion, it is relatively 
common to hear a person refer to ‘abortion on demand’. Yet this is based on a widely 
held misapprehension. In New Zealand, abortion is lawful up until the twentieth 
week of pregnancy, but only where continuing the pregnancy would pose a serious 
risk to the life, or to the physical or mental health, of the woman, or where there is 
a substantial risk of serious handicap in the child.47 The law reflects a view that the 
further developed a foetus has become, the more protection it is owed. Late abortions 
carried out in the second trimester for perceived trivial grounds have attracted 
scrutiny both internationally and domestically.48 
Clearly there is evidence of a widely held view that the more advanced a pregnancy is, 
the more compelling a reason must be to justify termination.49 Although the intrinsic 
value of reproductive liberty has been a powerful argument in favour of permitting 
abortion, it is a concept which is limited by the dictates of what is perceived to be 
broadly acceptable by society and the law.
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It is plausible to argue that the principle of choice and reproductive liberty provides 
a strong moral basis for claims in relation to the desire to conceive a child, just as 
it deserves respect in relation to the desire not to have a child.50 However, it must 
be acknowledged that, although it may exist, a right is not necessarily unqualified. 
The Report of the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee endorsed the view that achieving a pregnancy with the assistance of 
reproductive technology is an exercise of reproductive freedom.51 However, the 
Committee also agreed with the view that reproductive freedom was not absolute.52 
Reproductive freedom does not necessarily confer positive rights of access to assisted 
reproductive procedures. But it does mean that ‘the principles of choice and autonomy 
are principles or values that, among others, must be seriously considered’.53 John 
Robertson has cogently argued that:
… recognizing procreative liberty as a moral or legal right or important freedom 
does not mean that it is absolute, but rather that there is a strong presumption 
in its favor, with the burden on opponents to show that there is a good case for 
limiting it. Many critics, however, assume that claims of procreative liberty are 
claims of an inalienable or absolute right.54 But a right can be inalienable – not 
transferable to others – without being absolute. And no serious proponents of 
procreative liberty argue that it is absolute and can never be limited. Rather, the 
debate is (or should be) about whether particular exercises or classes of exercise of 
the right pose risks of such harm to others that they might justly be limited.55 
The approach adopted in this analysis is that the moral arguments which support 
reproductive liberty are as valid in respect of conceiving a child using assisted 
reproductive technology as they are in respect of supporting a woman’s right to 
choose to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. However, the concept of reproductive 
liberty does not confer unfettered choice. Rather, it signals the importance of the 
interests at hand. A presumption of reproductive liberty is arguably consistent with 
the objectives provided in the HART Act 2004. These expressly focus on protecting 
and promoting the interests of the individuals involved, particularly women and 
the putative children. The question is, to what extent should reproductive liberty be 
restrained and why? By virtue of the harm principle, legitimate restrictions on PGD 
require not only that a risk of harm must be demonstrated, but that it is of ‘sufficient 
magnitude to justify the harm caused to those whose liberty interest is curtailed’.56
2.3.1.3  Disability rights
Other rights which may be relevant to section 3(a) of the HART Act 2004 include 
disability rights. Some disability rights proponents have voiced concern that PGD 
devalues people with disabilities. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) 
1990 provides that everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
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grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993, which include the right 
not to be discriminated against on the grounds of disability.57 The NZBORA 1990 
applies to every person or body in the performance of any public function, power 
or duty conferred or imposed on that body by or pursuant to law.58 Consequently, 
the right to freedom from discrimination is an established legal right and persons 
exercising powers under the HART Act 2004 are subject to the provisions of the 
NZBORA 1990.
Although there are several strands to the concerns held by a subsection of disability 
rights advocates in regard to PGD and prenatal testing, the relevant concern for this 
section of the Act relates to discrimination.59 It is frequently observed that a ‘major 
problem with having a disability is not the disability per se, but the discrimination 
the disabled face for themselves and their families’.60 It follows that disability that 
results principally from impairment should be distinguished from disability that 
results from ‘a socially inadequate or discriminatory response to impairment’.61 
Consequently, the experience of disability extends beyond physical limitations to the 
way that society responds to the needs of people with particular disabilities. 
This is highly relevant. It has been said that the ‘choices’ provided by new genetic 
technologies may be illusory, given that 
society does not truly accept children with disabilities or provide assistance for 
their nurturance. Thus, a woman may see no realistic alternative to diagnosing 
and aborting a fetus likely to be affected, 62 
or, by analogy, engaging in PGD. In this context, it is important to consider that 
choices may be made on grounds that ‘reflect a particularly inflexible social structure 
rather than the particular severity of a medical condition’.63 There is also a resistance to 
PGD by those who perceive that permitting embryo diagnosis devalues and expresses 
discriminatory attitudes towards those already born with impairments.64 Yet the fact 
remains that not all the difficulties associated with disability are socially constructed; 
and parents may legitimately seek to avoid having their children experience significant 
functional limitations. Nor is it incompatible to wish on the one hand to avoid 
transmitting a genetic mutation, but on the other to support attempts to minimise 
discrimination towards the disabled and to support policies which assist the disabled 
to achieve their potential.65 As one commentator has noted:
for parents to wish to avoid the harms of impairment that are accentuated by 
lack of social support is not necessarily to collude in discriminatory practices, 
where society cannot be expected absolutely, rather than reasonably, to provide 
social support, given the diverse and conflicting interests that it is required to 
accommodate.66 
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The current policy in New Zealand permits prospective parents to undertake PGD if 
they are at risk of transmitting a serious genetic disorder. That decision is in keeping 
with the grounds for lawful abortion on the grounds of foetal abnormality. What 
is apparent is that there should not be an assumption on the part of providers or 
counsellors that parents must act to avoid disability, or make certain choices. Rather, 
families should be supported in decision-making with non-directive counselling and 
sufficient understanding of the relevant disorder. 
2.3.2  The principles
Under section 4 of the HART Act 2004 all persons exercising powers or performing 
functions pursuant to the Act must be guided by the principles declared in the Act. 
The first of these seven principles provides that the health and well-being of children 
born as a result of an assisted reproductive procedure or an established procedure 
should be an important consideration in all decisions about that procedure. 
2.3.2.1  Health and well-being of the child 
Clinicians, as well as policy-makers, have a specific responsibility concerning the 
interests of the future child. The primary aim of assisted reproductive technology, 
including PGD, is the achievement of a healthy live birth, yet the relative importance 
of the interests of the prospective child is not clearly established. The wording of the 
health and well-being principle in the Act deliberately eschews the usual paramount 
importance attributed to a child’s welfare in family law.67 Although the HART Bill 
(as amended by Supplementary Order Paper, No. 80, 2003) initially required that the 
health and well-being of children born as a result of assisted reproduction should 
be ‘paramount’ in all decisions about procedures, this provision was altered by the 
Health Select Committee during the legislative process.
The paramount welfare principle was rejected because it would narrowly circumscribe 
the performance of any procedure which may pose a physical or psychological risk 
to the prospective child. It could even be interpreted as implying that ‘one should 
not knowingly and intentionally bring a child into the world in less than ideal 
circumstances’.68 Because assisted reproductive technology necessarily entails greater 
risks than those associated with natural conception,69 the paramount provision 
could prevent the approval of assisted reproductive procedures because of those 
heightened risks.70 Similarly, it has been observed that, if the paramount welfare 
principle were consistently applied to all instances of reproduction, it would ‘exclude 
the overwhelming majority of the population from procreation’.71 
The polar opposite of the maximum risk principle is the minimum risk principle. 
The application of this principle would preclude the performance of an assisted 
reproductive procedure only when there is a serious risk that the life of the prospective 
child would be so miserable that it would not be a life worth living. Such a standard 
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would mean that the range of permissible procedures would be extremely broad 
regardless of risk. It attributes enormous importance to reproductive autonomy and 
parental autonomy. 
The welfare principle declared in the HART Act 2004 suggests that Parliament 
intends an intermediate position between these two extremes: it does not ascribe 
paramountcy to the future child’s welfare, but still requires that the future child’s 
health and well-being should be an important consideration. This avoids outcomes 
that would be counter-intuitive to many, such as preventing procedures from being 
undertaken on the basis of a risk so small as to be negligible on the one hand, or 
permitting procedures to be performed impervious to the risks posed to the future 
child on the other. 
Significantly, ‘health and well-being’ would appear to encompass not only physical 
well-being, but also the social, emotional, psychological and cognitive aspects of a 
child’s welfare. This potentially provides greater scope for expanding the ambit of PGD, 
by permitting a range of factors to be considered – not just physical considerations. 
What constitutes sufficient health and well-being is an open question. It may simply 
constitute ‘the abilities that are required for an individual to enjoy a normal range of 
opportunity in society’,72 as opposed to a life that is ‘significantly deficient in one or 
more major respects that generally make human lives valuable and worth living’.73 
2.3.2.2  Intergenerational justice
The second principle of the HART Act 2004 provides that ‘the human health, 
safety, and dignity of present and future generations should be preserved and 
promoted’.74 (Emphasis added.) It appears expressly to incorporate the principle of 
intergenerational justice into the principles of the HART Act 2004. 
The application of the principle of intergenerational justice to reproductive decision-
making has emerged over the last decade and a half. Adherence to this principle 
requires a consideration of the interests of future generations when making current 
decisions75 and is, essentially, the duty to prevent intergenerational harm.76 
The principle of intergenerational justice is open to wide interpretation. If given a 
radical interpretation, this requirement may be interpreted as precluding persons 
from knowingly passing on deleterious genes to their offspring and could justify the 
prevention, either by legal means or by overt pressure on prospective parents, of the 
births of children with severe genetic disease. Applying this interpretation, failure to 
avoid an affected pregnancy by undertaking PGD, or knowingly carrying an affected 
pregnancy, may contravene the concept of intergenerational justice. Such an outcome 
was foreseen by the commentator who made the following statement: 
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the completion of the human genome project will provide a basis for acting on 
a moral obligation for future generations, a claim that has appeared weak in 
the past. A generation with such knowledge who neglected to use it to minimize 
the risks in reproduction could hardly be said to respect the requirements of 
intergenerational justice.77 
Applying the concept of intergenerational justice in this way is to assert that parents 
who have a disabled child are harming not only that child, but also the community 
and potentially successive generations. It has been argued that the advances in 
reproductive genetics 
both reflect and reinforce the negative attitudes of our society towards those with 
disabilities. Indeed, medical genetics may add a new dimension if genetic disorder 
came to be seen as a matter of choice rather than of fate.78 
Such a position would represent the imposition of a coercive eugenic philosophy 
under the Act. Government imposed eugenics, a practice perceived as being both 
abhorrent and a breach of civil liberties, is arguably inconsistent with the intention 
of the Act which preserves individual rights. The purpose of the Act, which is to 
secure the benefits of assisted reproductive technology for individuals and society by 
providing for the protection and promotion of the health, safety, dignity and rights 
of all individuals, particularly women and children, in the use of these procedures, 
does not support such an extreme interpretation of this provision. It is clear from 
this purpose and the principles of the Act that the legislation is most concerned with 
protecting the interests and rights of those directly involved in assisted reproduction, 
that is the future child and the prospective parents, rather than imposing a genetic 
blueprint for society.79 Consequently, a less extreme application of the concept of 
intergenerational justice would ascribe more emphasis on individual rights and is 
more sympathetic to the overall philosophy of the HART Act 2004.
It is argued that section 4(b) acknowledges that assisted reproductive procedures 
can have intergenerational effects, and requires that the health, safety and dignity 
of both current and future generations be deemed relevant in the exercise of a 
power or performance of a function under the Act. Whilst the current regulatory 
framework signals that the prevention of the birth of children suffering from serious 
disorders is an acceptable reproductive choice for some prospective parents, it is not 
a government-imposed public health requirement. 
Although the concept of intergenerational justice may not be used as a basis for 
requiring  parents to make certain choices, it may and has been used to justify permitting 
certain choices, such as sex selection.80 Although sex selection is prohibited under 
the Act, an argument in favour of sex selection on the grounds of intergenerational 
justice has been made.
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This claim is predicated on the grounds that if it is accepted that one of the goals of 
assisted reproductive technology is to improve the objective well-being in a future 
child (by avoiding the birth of a disabled child), then the prevention of physical illness 
should not be the sole goal in the use of assisted reproductive technology. Rather, it 
is also justifiable to use such procedures when a future child could suffer poor levels 
of objective well-being not only as a result of medical factors, but also as a result of 
cognitive, emotional and social factors. This could occur when a child is exposed 
to harm ‘created because of the gender hostility of a specific social environment’.81 
If the objective well-being of children and parents is reduced, the existing and new 
children will be objectively harmed. This will apply to their children, and thus to a 
diminution of the objective well-being of future generations. In this way, the concept 
of intergenerational justice in section 4(b) of the Act may be used to justify an 
expansion of the range of reproductive choices, when they are construed as enhancing 
or protecting the well-being of future children.82
2.3.2.3  Health and well-being of women
The third principle of the HART Act 2004 provides that ‘while all persons are affected 
by assisted reproductive procedures and established procedures, women, more than 
men, are directly and significantly affected by their application, and the health and 
well-being of women must be protected in the use of these procedures’. 
This provision was drawn from one of the core principles provided by the Canadian 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004.83 However, in contrast to the HART Act 
2004, the Canadian legislation expressly prioritises the interests of the child to be 
born by providing that ‘the health and well-being of children born through the 
application of assisted human reproductive technologies must be given priority in all 
decisions respecting their use’.84 
Arguably, section 4(c) of the HART Act 2004 does not seek to prioritise the interests 
of the women involved. It merely seeks to signal the fact that women, regardless 
of the circumstances which have required them to seek assisted reproduction, are 
necessarily required to undertake the greatest burden of assisted reproduction. 
Consequently their health and well-being must be safeguarded in the performance of 
assisted reproductive procedures.85 The justification for the principle in the Canadian 
framework was as follows:
Equality should be promoted among women and men; however, reproductive 
policy development should not proceed as though reproduction affects women and 
men in the same way. The physical and social burdens and risks of reproduction 
are borne primarily by women. These realities should be acknowledged and 
reflected in reproductive policy.86
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Although it is unavoidable that women carry the greatest physical burden of IVF, in 
the context of PGD there may be additional considerations. PGD may be necessary 
because the man is a carrier of an autosomal dominant disorder. Because of this, he 
may feel significant guilt that his partner has to go through an invasive and difficult 
procedure. There is also mounting evidence that men’s reproductive health needs are 
insufficiently provided for in health policies in general.87 Whilst section 4(c) expressly 
provides that the health and well-being of women must be protected, it should not be 
seen to diminish the effects that assisted reproduction may have on men. 
It is argued that these principles flag the competing interests which must be taken 
into account under the Act, but do not elevate the interests of one party. 
2.3.2.4  Informed choice and informed consent
Additional principles in the Act include the principle that no procedure should be 
performed unless an individual has provided informed consent.88 This principle 
merely restates the general law with regard to medical treatment and, at first glance, 
appears unremarkable. However, in the context of assisted reproduction, decision-
making involving in vitro embryos is seldom a solitary endeavour. 
It is an open question whether PGD, for example, requires the consent of only one 
or both prospective parents, or whether implantation of an embryo may occur if 
the prospective father withdraws consent. Although these issues beg further analysis, 
they are beyond the scope of this report, which focuses on PGD in conjunction with 
HLA tissue typing, and negative selection of carrier embryos. 
The Act also provides a principle regarding donor offspring. However this principle 
is not relevant in the context of the current discussion. A further principle requires 
that the ‘needs, values, and beliefs of Mäori should be considered and treated with 
respect’. A comprehensive analysis of PGD from a Mäori perspective was undertaken 
in a prior report, and so will not be repeated here.89 Another relevant principle for 
this discussion is the final principle provided in the Act. It requires that the different 
perspectives in society are considered and treated with respect.
2.3.2.5  Ethical, spiritual and cultural perspectives in society
Section 4(g) of the Act declares the principle that  ‘the different ethical, spiritual, and 
cultural perspectives in society should be considered and treated with respect’. This 
last principle is significant as it derogates from what has, for the most part, dealt 
with the interests of those directly involved in assisted reproduction, and moves to 
collective interests in society.
The principle contained in section 4(g) acknowledges the extreme diversity of 
opinion which exists in relation to assisted reproduction. Whilst differing perspectives 
may not be reconcilable, the Act requires the exploration of these perspectives 
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in a conscientious and meaningful way. However, in no way does it diminish the 
underlying purpose of the Act, which is to secure the benefits of advances in assisted 
reproduction within a protective framework.
Several perspectives are relevant when considering PGD and expansions to the 
regulatory framework. These include the differing perspectives on the moral status 
of the embryo. As this issue was canvassed in detail in a prior report, it will not 
be analysed further here.90 Another perspective equates the use of new reprogenetic 
technologies with the conducting of eugenics. It is alleged that the avoidance of genetic 
disorders through the use of reprogenetic technology may have a negative impact on 
society. These perspectives have been central in debates regarding the introduction of 
PGD simpliciter, and are relevant when contemplating expansions beyond. 
2.3.2.5.1  Eugenics
When PGD was first introduced it was accompanied by an outpouring of eugenic 
concerns. This was, in part, a reaction rooted in the legacy left by the systematic 
government-imposed discrimination towards individuals on the basis of genetic 
characteristics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The eugenics 
movement subscribed to the idea that certain characteristics such as intelligence 
were hereditary. Consequently, those considered to have suitably good heritable 
characteristics were encouraged to have more children, and others were discouraged 
or actively prevented from parenting.91 
New Zealand was not immune to eugenic influences when the Mental Defectives 
Amendment Bill was introduced into Parliament in 1928.92 The Bill contained 
provisions which, if enacted, would have permitted the compulsory sterilisation of 
people judged to be mentally defective. It also restricted the right of persons deemed 
mentally defective to marry. These provisions were met with vehement parliamentary 
opposition. Although the Bill was eventually passed, these clauses were not included.93 
It has been claimed that ‘New Zealand was alone in the economically developing 
world in rejecting a formal proposition for the sterilization if not castration of people 
designated socially as “unfit”’.94 
Some commentators have argued that as a result of ‘social pressures and eugenic 
attitudes held by clinical geneticists in most countries, it [PGD] results in eugenic 
outcomes even though no state coercion is involved’.95 Because PGD concerns 
embryos rather than established pregnancies, it is distinguishable from prenatal 
testing in ‘ethical, legal, social and psychological terms’.96 Consequently, the scope for 
selection is arguably greater as is the possibility of coercion and reduced choice.97 
Other commentators have cautioned that we should take care not to misuse eugenic 
events, such as the Nazi experience, which may in fact have very little to do with 
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an individual’s or couple’s decision not to have a child with a severe disease.98 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) has provided the following definition of 
eugenics: 
A coercive policy intended to further a reproductive goal, against the rights, 
freedoms, and choices of the individual … Cultures or medical settings may be 
implicitly coercive and are aware of the need for vigilance against tacit coercion, 
but considered such problems as part of the general social context rather than as 
eugenic programs.
It goes on to observe:
Under the above definition, knowledge-based, goal-oriented individual or family 
choices to have a healthy baby do not constitute eugenics. Such choices are unlikely 
to affect the gene pool or to reduce the numbers of persons with disabilities. Most 
disabilities are not the results of chromosomal or single-gene disorders, and most 
babies born with a genetic disorder are born to families with no known risk for 
having a child with that condition. 
Eugenics is directed against whole populations, whereas the work of today’s 
clinical geneticists is directed towards individuals and families. However, it is 
important to be aware that collective results of individual decisions could lead 
to social policies that discriminate against the minority who make different 
decisions and especially against persons with disabilities.99 
Arguments based on eugenics ignore the fact that, for some parents at risk of transmitting 
what they consider are serious heritable diseases, PGD is a medical imperative and 
should be a matter of individual choice. PGD is not a State-imposed requirement. 
However, the provision of services and perceived coercion by professionals is very 
much a live issue. Eugenic concerns do not displace the presumption of reproductive 
liberty when considering expansions to PGD for disease-related genotypes. However, 
as is evident in the WHO report, eugenic concerns are relevant to the way in which 
PGD services are provided.
2.  conclusion
Crafting public policy on contentious issues, such as those raised by assisted 
reproductive technology and PGD where there is not only an absence of public 
consensus but also extremely polarised and strongly held views, requires more than 
an intuitive, personal response to complex issues. Mary Warnock’s characterisation 
of the difference between policy-making and intuitive private moral responses is 
compelling in this context: 
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The pub bore speaks intuitively ... Even if he has good reasons for his judgement that 
something is ‘disgusting’, he may not be able to articulate them … His conclusion, 
that the thing is wrong, may be perfectly sound. But he makes the false assumption 
that his judgement should, or could, be instantly translated into a law which should 
govern everyone, and turn that which he is objecting to into a criminal offence. 
When people become legislators or politicians, they assume new responsibilities. 
They have specifically to exercise reason and caution in attempting to foresee the 
consequences for everyone, including minority groups, of the measures they are 
proposing … Moreover, they owe a duty to be able to explain why they have come 
to the conclusion they have. They must be seen to have thought rationally; and 
in public circumstances this means that they be seen to have thought about the 
long-term consequences of what it is they propose. They must be seen to be steady 
and consistent in the stance they take, not only because they will probably advance 
their own careers if so perceived, but because steady and principled government is 
what is actually needed by society. So the overlap, or interplay, between the public 
and private comes at the place where principles are to be articulated, and the 
consequences for society as a whole openly taken into account.100
Clearly, the formulation of good social policy requires close examination of the issues 
involved, a rejection of rhetoric and dogma and a search for a shared value. Principles 
must be articulated and the consequences for society as a whole openly taken into 
account. This is what is required by the HART Act 2004.
Although the provision of PGD in New Zealand has become part of mainstream 
medicine, and may be carried out as an established procedure in some instances, it is 
still subject to regulatory restraint under the HART Act 2004. When considering the 
legitimacy of those restraints, and possible extensions to the framework, it is necessary 
to determine the effect of the objectives and principles contained in the Act. 
The HART Act 2004 declares certain objectives and provides a list of principles which 
must guide both policy-makers and providers of fertility services. However, there is 
no clear articulation of the underlying principle or principles which should be applied 
in this context, nor of how the stated objectives and principles are to be balanced. 
With the introduction of the HART Act 2004, Parliament arguably has established 
a middle ground which on the one hand rejects radical reproductive liberty (which 
would render all reproductive decision-making a matter of personal conscience), 
but on the other hand seeks to secure the benefits of assisted reproduction within a 
protective framework. 
Although the principle of reproductive liberty is not expressly stated or incorporated 
in the Act, the objectives and principles taken together do not preclude a presumption 
of reproductive liberty as a starting point. Rather, the first objective of the Act is to 
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protect and promote the health, safety, dignity and rights of all individuals, and of 
women and children in particular, in the use of assisted reproductive procedures. 
The purpose of the Act expressly refers to the promotion of the dignity and rights 
of individuals in the use of assisted reproductive technology, and clearly expresses 
a commitment to the preservation of individual rights. Reproductive liberty may 
be reconciled within the principles which expressly focus on the interests of the 
individuals involved, particularly women and the prospective children, and the 
perspectives of the community. 
Reproductive liberty is an established principle in relation to natural conception. 
It is argued that it is equally applicable to assisted reproduction and is preserved by 
virtue of the first purpose declared in the Act. The moral arguments which support 
reproductive autonomy with regard to a woman’s right to abortion are equally valid 
with regard to the use of assisted reproductive technology to conceive a healthy, 
genetically related child. Reproductive autonomy is intimately associated with a 
woman’s right to make reproductive choices. In the context of PGD, decisions are 
generally those of the prospective parents, made on the basis of their combined 
genetic codes; it is seldom a solitary endeavour. In both contexts there are strong 
moral arguments in favour of respecting autonomy and values such as freedom 
of choice which underlie reproductive endeavours. Individual choices may not be 
universally endorsed, but this does not mean that certain activities should necessarily 
be prohibited. The principle of reproductive liberty does not confer a right to 
unfettered choice or access, but it signals the importance of the interests involved 
and the respect owed. The question is why and to what extent reproductive liberty 
should be limited.
It can be argued that when contemplating the current regulatory framework for PGD, 
and the expansion of the scope of permissible PGD, a presumption of reproductive 
liberty is the appropriate starting point. This position should then be scrutinised 
with reference to the principles set out in the Act. 
Whilst it has been argued that human dignity is an elusive concept which has, in 
relation to scientific progress, been used to support various outcomes, dignity has 
traditionally been associated with an individual’s inherent right to autonomy and 
respect. The notions of human dignity and human rights are easily invoked to 
support various outcomes in relation to reprogenetic technology. Whilst they may be 
used as a justification for restraint, they may also be used in support of autonomous 
action. The reference to both ‘dignity’ and ‘rights’ in the Act supports the argument 
that the right to reproductive liberty, a freedom which is accepted as a fundamental 
human right to varying degrees in all liberal democracies, is not abrogated by the Act. 
However, claims based on dignity must be fully articulated and weighed against the 
relevant interests and principles at stake, including the right to reproductive liberty. 
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The principle regarding the welfare of the future child is notable in that it does not 
ascribe paramountcy to the health and well-being of a future child, a protection 
accorded a child in family law proceedings once born. Significantly, ‘health and 
well-being’ arguably encompasses not only physical well-being, but also the social, 
emotional, psychological and cognitive aspects of welfare. The well-being of a child is 
significantly affected by the family into which it is born. Consequently, the well-being 
of the family is integral to the well-being of the child. This may provide greater scope 
for expanding the ambit of PGD in certain circumstances. 
The concept of intergenerational justice may support arguments for expanding the 
regulatory framework; indeed, a radical interpretation of the concept may require 
parents to use PGD and prenatal diagnosis where there is a known risk of harm to a 
future generation. However, this is inconsistent with the current public health and 
social policy agenda of New Zealand if it is accepted that the objective in the provision 
of reprogenetic technology is to enable access to treatment and to help at-risk people 
make fully informed, autonomous decisions. The principle of intergenerational 
justice should not be used to exert pressure on prospective parents to make certain 
choices as part of a public health or social policy agenda, as this is not consistent with 
the purposes of the Act. 
The requirement that the health and well-being of women must be protected in the use 
of assisted reproductive technology acknowledges the central role played by women in 
assisted reproduction, but is arguably limited to the safe provision and use of assisted 
reproductive technology. Neither disability rights arguments nor eugenic concerns 
displace the presumption of reproductive liberty when considering expansions to 
PGD for disease-related genotypes. However these concerns are potently relevant to 
the way in which PGD services are provided. Whilst expanded reproductive choice 
in relation to heritable disease-related genotypes is to be welcomed, the obligation to 
engage in PGD, or to make certain choices, is another thing altogether. 
The issue, for the purposes of this report, is whether the current limits on reproductive 
liberty in relation to HLA tissue typing and negative selection of carrier embryos may 
be justified, or whether the scope should be extended. The report is mindful that, 
on the basis of the harm principle, legitimate restrictions to PGD require not only 
that a reasonable risk of harm must be demonstrated, but also that it is of sufficient 
magnitude to justify curtailing the autonomy of those seeking PGD services.101
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  PgD anD human leukocyte antigen (hla) tissue tyPing
.1  introduction
PGD in conjunction with human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing involves 
testing embryos to determine their compatibility as haematopoietic stem cell (HSC) 
donors for siblings suffering from life-threatening diseases. When a child is suffering 
from a congenital disease or neoplastic disorder which affects the formation of blood 
cells and/or the immune system, transplantation of HSCs such as those contained 
in umbilical cord blood or bone marrow is currently the best course of treatment 
for the affected child.102 HSC transplantation may also be indicated for a number of 
metabolic diseases such as adreno-leukodystrophy.103 When there is no HLA-identical 
donor available in the family, PGD can be used to select an embryo with the same 
HLA tissue type as the sick sibling. 
The first applications of PGD in conjunction with HLA tissue typing in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom involved performing PGD to diagnose the 
presence of a deleterious genetic mutation (in the former case Fanconi anaemia and 
in the latter thalassaemia) in addition to carrying out HLA tissue typing on in vitro 
embryos. Performing PGD to create a child to save another has attracted considerable 
debate in itself as evidenced by the interest generated by these two cases. However, 
the distinction between performing preimplantation tissue typing as an adjunct to 
the diagnosis of a serious genetic condition and performing it solely to determine 
tissue compatibility with a seriously ill sibling has added another dimension to the 
controversy.
New Zealand has only recently begun to address these issues with the introduction 
of the Guidelines on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in 2005.104 Although drafted 
by the ethical body which preceded the introduction of the HART Act 2004, the 
Guidelines now constitute ACART guidelines for the purposes of the Act.105
PGD in conjunction with HLA tissue typing is currently the only application of PGD 
that comes within the remit of ECART as a regulated activity. Pursuant to the Act, 
PGD with HLA tissue typing may only be performed with the prior written approval 
of ECART.106 Applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Ethical approval 
may only be given when the applicants meet the requirements prescribed in the 
Guidelines.107 Currently, the Guidelines restrict the performance of HLA tissue typing 
in conjunction with PGD to circumstances in which the live sibling is suffering from 
a familial single gene or sex-linked disorder, as well as providing significant other 
restraints. It is the substantive provisions of these Guidelines which are the focus of 
this section. 
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Before undertaking an analysis of the Guidelines, a brief background will be provided 
regarding the history of the donation of HSCs by a minor child to a sibling suffering 
from a severe, life-threatening disorder. General clinical considerations raised 
by embryonic HLA tissue typing and HSC transplantation will then be outlined. 
Following this, the provisions and implications of the current Guidelines will be 
examined. Because of the nature of the subject matter, this analysis necessarily 
requires a review of the legal position regarding the donation of tissue and organs 
by an incompetent minor to a sick sibling. The question addressed in this section is 
whether, given the presumption of reproductive liberty established in the previous 
section of this report, the restraints on HLA tissue typing provided in the Guidelines are 
justified. It will be argued that the Guidelines are ethically and legally problematic.
.2  Background
The complexity of the saviour sibling issue exists because of the breadth of interests 
implicated by the use of this new technology. These interests have been described by 
one commentator as including: 
the rights of parents to be able to make reproductive decisions, the rights of the sick 
child to medical treatment and to hope, the rights of the donor child to be loved 
for themselves and to be free from exploitation, the ethics of tissue donations from 
incompetent individuals, the degree to which family autonomy will be upheld, 
and the rights of the broader community to have a say in the directions new 
science takes us.108
Sibling donation of HSCs is not a new medical technology. Nor is the intentional 
conception of HLA-matched sibling donors. Rather, it is the performance of these 
activities in the context of PGD that is new. 
Prior to the advent of PGD, parents of children with severe, life-threatening diseases 
that could be cured by a HSC transplant attempted to conceive a healthy HLA-
matched child naturally. The precursor to transplantation of HSCs from cord blood 
was transplantation of HSCs from bone marrow. The attempted conception of 
children to save siblings was practiced as early as 1987, and was achieved in some 
instances.109 The first successful allogeneic bone marrow transplant (i.e. bone marrow 
from another person) was carried out in 1968 when a five-month-old infant received 
HSCs from a sibling.110 When it became possible to diagnose Fanconi anaemia and 
HLA-type prenatally in the 1980s, it was reported that between 1985 and 1993 thirty-
two pregnancies were conceived in the hopes of providing a donor child for a sibling 
with the disease.111 Some of these attempts failed whilst other couples were faced 
with aborting affected foetuses. In two cases healthy foetuses that were not HLA 
compatible with the sick sibling were terminated. 
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Allogeneic bone marrow transplantation is now an established therapy in the treatment 
of haematological malignancies, bone marrow failure syndromes, immunodeficiency 
states, and metabolic disorders.112 Because of the limitations associated with bone 
marrow transplantation, namely the lack of suitable donors, the risk of graft-versus-
host disease and opportunistic infection, transplants using umbilical cord blood stem 
cells were first postulated as an alternative source of HSCs in the early 1980s.113 
In 1988 the first successful umbilical cord blood transplant was undertaken for a 
child suffering from Fanconi anaemia.114 Twelve years later the first child conceived 
after successful PGD and HLA tissue typing was born in the United States. The 
parents wished to avoid the birth of a child affected by Fanconi anaemia, and to 
have a child who was a tissue match for their affected daughter. The six-year-old 
sibling underwent a successful cord blood transplant three weeks later.115 Since 
then the range of diseases and indications for which PGD for HLA matching could 
theoretically be used has grown considerably, as illustrated by the list provided at the 
end of this section.  Although the conception of sibling donors has a long history, the 
use of PGD to diagnose tissue type is an innovation of the twentieth century and is 
strictly regulated in New Zealand. Before considering the nature of those restrictions, 
the following section provides a brief précis of the clinical context. 
.  clinical considerations
Any analysis of the Guidelines requires some appreciation of the clinical context. 
Whilst there are strong clinical reasons in favour of umbilical cord transplant from 
an HLA-matched sibling, other considerations must also be taken into account. 
3.3.1  Rationale for using umbilical cord blood haematopoietic stem cells (HSCs)
Transplantation of HSCs from umbilical cord blood is generally considered to be 
superior to bone marrow transplant, and transplantation of cord blood from an 
HLA-matched sibling even more so. The benefits of cord blood HSC transplantation 
(HSCT) include the diminished risk for the donor. The physical collection of stem 
cells from the umbilicus is a relatively safe and straightforward procedure, without 
the risks of general anaesthesia, bleeding or infection associated with bone marrow 
harvesting. 
Most importantly, there is a lower incidence of acute and chronic graft-versus-host 
disease in the recipient in the case of sibling cord blood transplants compared with 
bone marrow transplants.116 Umbilical cord blood donors and recipients may not 
need to be HLA matched with the same rigour as for bone marrow transplants.117 
In addition, there is a lower risk of viral contamination with cord blood than with 
bone marrow transplants.118 Whilst transplantation of HSCs from the umbilical 
cord blood of an HLA-matched sibling may present the best chance of recovery for 
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children suffering from some serious, life-threatening conditions, it is not without 
clinical limitations.
3.3.2  Limitations
The statistical chance that a cycle of PGD will provide an HLA-matched embryo 
is relatively low, at only 25 per cent. This percentage falls to around 18 per cent if 
PGD is performed to diagnose an embryo that is both free of an autosomal recessive 
condition, such as Fanconi anaemia or thalassaemia, and is a suitable match.119 
Transplantation of umbilical stem cells is currently limited by the age and weight of 
the affected child. Whilst cord blood may be adequate for small children below 25kg, 
bone marrow transplantation is usually indicated in the case of older children.120 In 
some instances this may preclude the performance of an umbilical transplant even 
after an HLA-identical sibling is born. Because of this, parents may seek subsequent 
bone marrow donation.121 
Although an umbilical cord blood transplant lowers the risk of morbidity and 
mortality in the recipient, there is always a possibility that HSCT of umbilical cord 
blood will not be successful for several reasons. The transplant may be unsuccessful 
as a result of graft failure or because of a recurrence of disease in the sibling post 
transplant. Additionally, the success of the treatment may differ depending on the 
disease from which the sick child suffers.
3.3.3  Disease-free survival (DFS) of sibling 
It is established that disease-free survival (DFS) after HSCT with an HLA-identical 
donor is variable depending upon the disease suffered by the sick child.122 HSCT 
from a compatible donor does not guarantee the donee a disease-free existence; but, 
for certain diseases, it comes close. Whilst DFS is only 30 to 50 per cent for some 
acquired illnesses, such as acute leukaemia and non-Hodgkin lymphoma, it may be 
as high as 80 to 90 per cent in the case of acquired severe aplastic anaemia.123 DFS also 
appears to be relatively high in the case of genetic diseases such as thalassaemia major 
(70 to 90 per cent cure), sickle cell anaemia (80 to 90 per cent cure) and Fanconi 
anaemia (80 to 90 per cent cure), and in the case of immunodeficiencies (70 to 90 
per cent cure).124 
3.3.4  Risks to the newborn saviour sibling
Possible risks to the future child have also been a limiting factor. Potential harms 
to a child born as a result of PGD with HLA tissue typing may arise not only as a 
result of the retrieval of cord blood stem cells, but as a result of the IVF cycle, or at 
the point of embryo biopsy. Currently, evidence indicates that the physical risk to a 
child born after embryo biopsy carried out in the course of PGD is not significantly 
greater than that incurred with IVF in general.125 The incidence, and nature, of 
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obstetric and neonatal complications after PGD is comparable to those reported after 
IVF alone.126
Although the risks involved with PGD are not significantly greater than those linked 
to IVF, there are established risks associated with IVF. Singleton children born as a 
result of IVF are more likely to be born early, be of low birth weight and have poorer 
neonatal health outcomes than naturally-conceived children.127 The risk of preterm 
delivery for singletons conceived as a result of IVF is around twice that of natural 
conception. Neonatal, perinatal and infant mortality rates are twice as high for babies 
conceived by IVF as for natural conceptions.128 Although these risks exist, they are 
not generally considered sufficiently high to deter infertile people from attempting 
to achieve a pregnancy, or legally to preclude them from doing so. 
Generally, obtaining cord blood HSCs poses negligible physical risk to the neonate 
as the cells are aspirated from the umbilical cord and placenta after the umbilical 
cord has been clamped. However, it is possible that aggressive early cord clamping 
may have adverse effects on a premature newborn or a newborn of very low birth 
weight.129 Because the likelihood of successful transplantation of cord blood HSCs is 
related to the volume and cell dose collected, there is pressure to ensure a sufficiently 
large volume of cord blood at the time of collection.130 Early cord clamping as close 
to the neonate as possible ensures that the largest possible volume of neonatal blood 
is retained in the placenta and umbilical cord. However preterm babies are at risk 
of anaemia and haemodynamic instability. There is some evidence that a 30 to 120-
second delay in umbilical cord clamping is associated with fewer transfusions for 
anaemia and fewer intra-ventricular haemorrhages in preterm infants.131 
A little-mentioned fact is that certain diseases, such as insulin-dependent diabetes 
mellitus, multiple sclerosis and rheumatoid arthritis, have shown associations with 
certain HLA antigens.132 For example, ankylosing spondylitis is associated with 
the HLA B27. A person with B27 has a ‘markedly increased risk’ of developing the 
condition.133 When an embryo is HLA tissue typed, the procedure is carried out 
without determining if it is associated with a certain disease. However, it has been 
stated that the increased risk will be relatively small in most cases.134 
3.3.5  Summary
It may be thought difficult to justify HLA tissue typing given the low prospects that 
an HLA-matched embryo will be created, and the even lower chance that an embryo 
at risk of inheriting a genetic disease will be both an HLA match and mutation-
free. However, it may also be argued that the statistics are not so low as to make it 
unreasonable to attempt PGD with HLA tissue typing in the case of some severe 
or life-threatening diseases where cord blood HSC transplant confers a reasonable 
chance of success. 
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Because using PGD to conceive an HLA-matched child involves intensive technical 
intervention, it is inaccurate to describe the entire process as a minimal-risk procedure. 
The clinical risks involved are the generic risks associated with IVF, with additional 
potential risks in the case of a preterm or low birth weight neonate in relation to early 
cord clamping. What may be said is that the risks are those known risks  associated 
with IVF, and the as yet unknown long-term effects of embryo biopsy. However, these 
clinical risks must be balanced against the disease-free survival rates of children after 
umbilical cord HSC transplant from HLA compatible siblings. These statistics are 
extremely compelling for certain disorders, and include disorders which are both 
genetic and non-genetic in origin.
However, it is clearly possible that a child conceived to be an HLA match for a sick 
sibling could face the prospect of donating bone marrow instead of umbilical cord 
blood; or could face subsequent bone marrow donation after an initial umbilical 
cord cell transplant fails. It is possible that chemotherapy and irradiation or 
immunosuppressive drugs, which must be undertaken by the donee prior to HSCT, 
may cause organ damage and subsequent organ failure in the recipient’s kidneys, 
liver or other organs.135 Hence there is potential for the recipient, at some point in 
the recipient’s life, to require tissue or even solid organs beyond that provided by the 
initial cord blood transplant, and the HLA-matched sibling will be a likely candidate 
as a donor. 
Consequently, concerns are not limited to potential physical risks, but extend to 
possible psychological sequelae for a child that is conceived to be a donor. Justifications 
provided for restraint include the potential instrumentalisation of the future child, 
the possible physical exploitation of the donor child for ongoing donation and the 
concern that parents may feel morally obliged to engage in this technology if it 
becomes more prevalent. There are concerns that extending the ambit of PGD to 
selection on the basis of tissue type could lead to the use of foetal tissue to provide 
HSC, and the use of PGD for selection of non-medical traits. 
Starting from a presumption of reproductive freedom, the critical issue is whether 
the concerns raised are sufficient to displace the interests of parents, who wish to 
undergo the procedure when there is a reasonable chance of success, and of the sick 
child, who may have an opportunity for survival. The principle of reproductive 
freedom and the primary purpose of the HART Act 2004, which is to ‘secure the 
benefits of assisted reproductive procedures …’, must be borne in mind. Also relevant 
is section 4(a) which provides that the ‘health and well-being of children born’ should 
be an ‘important consideration’ in all decisions about that procedure. The Act also 
requires that the ‘health, safety and dignity of present and future generations should 
be preserved and promoted’.136 This clearly focuses attention not only on the child to 
be born, but also on the children already born to a family and the parents. 
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It will be argued that it is far more difficult to justify the restriction of this procedure 
than it is to defend its provision. Whilst it is accepted that there is a role for regulatory 
oversight by the State to protect the welfare of the donor child, the degree to which 
the State circumscribes access to this technology must be justified by reference to 
significantly relevant harms. Although there may be concerns that mandate caution, 
there are principles such as reproductive liberty and parental autonomy which point 
in a different direction.
.  guidelines on Preimplantation genetic Diagnosis
3.4.1  Introduction
Although there is an established legal regime which permits parents to provide proxy 
consent to sibling bone marrow donation on behalf of their incompetent minor 
children, most jurisdictions which permit PGD with HLA tissue typing require prior 
approval from the relevant body. New Zealand is no different. The reason for caution 
lies in the distinction between permitting an existing child to donate tissue, and 
creating a child for that purpose. However, the current guidelines narrowly restrict 
those who may access PGD with HLA tissue typing.
As previously indicated, HLA tissue typing is a regulated procedure under the 
HART Act 2004. PGD in conjunction with HLA tissue typing may only be carried out 
with prior ethical approval from ECART, the ethics committee established under the 
Act.137 ECART may only approve applications which are consistent with guidelines 
issued by ACART.138 The Guidelines are effective until 21 November 2007, unless 
revoked sooner.139
Section 2 of the Guidelines provides that HLA tissue typing in conjunction with PGD 
must be submitted for ethics committee approval on a case-by-case basis.140 The 
discretionary power of the ethics committee is significantly limited. The Guidelines 
provide specific criteria, which must be met in relation to both the affected child and 
the prospective embryo, before approval may be given. The final criterion requires 
that HLA tissue typing in conjunction with PGD may only be carried out where the 
health and well-being of the family/whānau has been fully considered. In relation to 
the existing sick child it is required that:
 7.1 the affected child suffers from a familial single gene disorder or a familial  
 sex-linked disorder and 
 7.2 no other possibilities for treatment or sources of tissue are available and 
 7.3 the planned treatment for the affected child will utilise only the cord blood  
 of the future sibling and 
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as regards the embryo, it is required that:
 7.4 the embryo will be a sibling of the affected child and 
 7.5 the embryo is at risk of being affected by a familial single gene disorder or a 
 familial sex-linked disorder for which a PGD test is available. 
The restrictive nature of the Guidelines indicates an overriding concern to protect the 
perceived interests of the future child. Section 4(a) of the HART Act 2004 provides 
that ‘the health and well-being of children born as a result of the performance of an 
assisted reproductive procedure should be an important consideration in all decisions 
about that procedure’. However, it is not the only relevant principle in this context. A 
critique follows of arguments based on the health and well-being of the future child 
which have been put forward to justify the restricting of HLA tissue typing.
Those who are fundamentally opposed to HLA tissue typing in principle perceive 
that conceiving a child for the purposes of providing a donor sibling is an aberration 
of responsible parenthood.141 The concept of responsible parenthood in this context 
presumes two beliefs in particular: first, that ‘good parents conceive a child for itself ’; 
and, secondly, that ‘good parents accept the child as it comes’.142 This latter view 
which demands nothing less than unconditional acceptance of a prospective child 
is problematic under existing law. It would preclude the conception of a saviour 
sibling when the sick sibling suffers from a genetic disorder – a process already 
permitted under the current Guidelines. If carried to its logical conclusion, it would 
also preclude prenatal testing and abortion as well as selection on the basis of any 
disability whatsoever, and this would be incongruent with the law. Consequently, this 
is not a tenable argument to justify legal restriction. 
It has been argued that intentionally conceiving an HLA-matched child to act as a 
donor instrumentalises and treats the prospective child as a means to an end, rather 
than as an end in its own right. This constitutes a prima facie breach of that future 
child’s inherent dignity and breaches the Kantian dictum to “Act so that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and 
never as a means only”.143 However, it is trite to counter this perceived ethical breach 
by distinguishing between using a person as a means to an end and solely using a 
person as a means to an end.144 Whilst the former is a part of every day life, the latter 
is objectionable. 
The idea that parental motives for having a child must not be superimposed with 
any collateral parental goals is an idealistic concept. The reasons why parents choose 
to conceive children are numerous and varied, and some undoubtedly nobler than 
others. Conception may occur as a result of a couple’s combined desire to raise and 
love a child, or to appease a partner who wants a child, or to provide a playmate 
for an existing child, or to attempt to have a child of a particular sex. Concerns of 
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instrumentalisation are not persuasive when it is considered that conceiving a child 
to be a donor ‘is not any worse or less altruistic than the myriad of other reasons for 
which children are sought’.145 The morally relevant point is that the parents want the 
child in the child’s own right. 
It has been observed that concerns that a saviour sibling were regarded solely as a 
means to an end would be borne out if the parents abused or neglected the donor child, 
or surrendered the child for adoption after cord donation.146 Some ethics committees 
have considered that the absence of a prior wish to conceive a child before the need 
to create a donor arose may be prima facie evidence of instrumentalisation of the 
prospective child.147 This could constitute criteria for denying parents the opportunity 
to conceive a saviour sibling. Yet this ‘prior wish’ concern is not persuasive. It is not 
uncommon for people to change their reproductive plans given a change in parental 
attitudes or personal circumstances. What is important is that the prospective child 
is wanted as well as being able to be a compatible tissue donor. The motives parents 
have for conceiving a child are not decisive of the relationship they will have with 
that child. Rather: 
The morally relevant point is not that parents have the right motive for conceiving 
the child, but that they love and care for the donating child and protect its best 
interests once it is born. The few instances in which parents have asked for medical 
assistance to obtain a compatible sibling strongly indicate that they intend to do 
so. The use or instrumentalization of the donating child does not demonstrate 
disrespect for his or her autonomy and intrinsic value.148 
The basis for concerns regarding instrumentalisation is that the procedure is not 
carried out for the benefit or best interests of the child born, but to benefit a third 
party. However, it has been cogently argued that psychosocial benefits may accrue to 
a donor child as a result of being a donor.149 These benefits are that the child is born 
into a family which has a chance of remaining intact. The child has the benefit of 
growing up with the sibling if the HSCT is successful. Essentially, the benefit is that 
which accrues to the entire family in the event that the sick child is cured.150
Although embryo biopsy does not appear significantly to increase the risks associated 
with IVF, the long-term effect of PGD will not be known until sufficient empirical 
studies establish good scientific data. This uncertainty must be balanced against the 
potential benefit to the sick sibling and the family. 
It will be argued that the limitations imposed both in relation to the sick child and 
the prospective embryo, except for the requirement that the embryo be a sibling of 
the affected child, are clinically, ethically and legally problematic. Taken together, 
these difficulties mandate wholesale revision of the HLA guidelines.
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3.4.2  Clause 7.1 
The affected child suffers from a familial single gene disorder or a familial sex-
linked disorder
The objective of clause 7.1 is to restrict the performance of HLA tissue typing to 
circumstances in which the sick child is suffering from a disorder which is genetic 
in origin.151 However, the effect of drawing a distinction between genetic and non-
genetic conditions can have capricious results. The restriction means that the parents 
of a child who is suffering from a serious, life-threatening condition cannot attempt 
to access this procedure if their child’s illness is not heritable. Some conditions such 
as diamond black fan anaemia (DBA) may be the result of either a sporadic or an 
inherited mutation. DBA is a rare form of anaemia which results in bone marrow 
failure. Although DBA may initially be treated with steroids, the only cure is HSC 
transplantation. Under the current guidelines, parents whose child is suffering from 
inherited DBA may apply to undergo PGD with HLA tissue typing, whilst those 
whose child has a sporadic mutation may not. 
The restriction in clause 7.1 is based on concerns for the putative donor child. Whilst 
the consequences of being conceived to be a donor child must be addressed under 
the Act, the balance of argument weighs against restricting HLA tissue typing to 
instances where there is a genetic risk. This very issue was played out in the United 
Kingdom when the interim HLA tissue typing policy of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority (HFEA) was released in 2001.152 It was the first attempt 
to delineate parameters permitting the creation of saviour siblings utilising PGD 
technology.153 The current New Zealand policy on HLA tissue typing bears a striking 
resemblance to this initial HFEA policy. 
Under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK), the HFEA, when 
drafting policy, is similarly required to take account of the welfare of any child born 
as a result of treatment.154 Significantly, the HFEA received advice provided by the 
HFEA Ethics Committee that, when considering the welfare of the unborn child, the 
inquiry should not be restricted to a narrow, legal perspective regarding the future 
child’s welfare or best interests.155 Rather, it should include the ‘wider question of 
the putative child’s moral, psychological, social and physical welfare’.156 The Ethics 
Committee favoured a principle of ‘constrained parental decision-making’ with 
regard to performing PGD with HLA tissue typing.157 It was recommended that 
the technique should be available where an existing sibling suffered from a life-
threatening but non-genetic condition. 
These recommendations were not followed by the HFEA. The interim HFEA policy 
authorised the performance of HLA tissue typing in conjunction with PGD, but 
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restricted the procedure, as under the current New Zealand guidelines, to instances 
where the condition suffered by the sick sibling was genetic in origin. The rationale 
for this distinction was the purported lack of evidence regarding future health risks 
to the resulting child from the embryo biopsy. Consequently, embryo biopsy could 
only be considered to be in the interests of the future child if it conferred the primary 
benefit of being born free of a genetic disorder. Where the putative risks of biopsy 
could not be justified on the basis of this perceived benefit to the future child, then 
carrying out the procedure could not be justified, as it would not be in the interests 
of the future child. 
The distinction made by the HFEA has been the subject of sustained academic 
criticism.158 One criticism made is that it is inaccurate to describe embryo biopsy 
as conferring the benefit of a disease-free existence on the resulting child where 
there is a risk of inheriting a genetic disorder. Biopsy merely detects the presence or 
absence of a genetic mutation; it does not change disease status.159 Ultimately, biopsy 
confers the benefit of provision of information on which the decision to select the 
embryo for transfer is made. The benefit comes down to selection for implantation. 
Consequently, the distinction between performing biopsy in the presence or absence 
of genetic risk on the basis that it confers a benefit on the resulting child in the former 
case but not in the latter is erroneous. 
The restrictive interim HFEA policy was put to the test when the first family with a 
child suffering from a disorder which was not genetic in origin applied, unsuccessfully, 
for approval to undertake PGD in conjunction with HLA tissue typing.160 The case 
received widespread media and academic attention.161 Ultimately the HFEA’s restrictive 
policy could not be retained in the face of the compelling arguments raised. 
In 2004 the HFEA released a new policy on preimplantation tissue typing, which 
dispensed with the distinction between performing HLA tissue typing in the presence 
or absence of genetic disease. Effectively, the original recommendations made by the 
Ethics Committee in 2001 were adopted in the revised policy.162 It was stated that:
Balancing the likely benefit of preimplantation tissue typing – to the sick sibling, 
the new baby and the family as a whole – against a better understanding of the 
possible physical and psychological risks to the child to be born, the Authority 
concluded that preimplantation tissue typing should be available, subject to 
appropriate safeguards, in cases in which there is a genuine need for potentially 
life-saving tissue and a likelihood of therapeutic benefit for an affected child.163 
For similar reasons, the current restrictive policy in New Zealand should be 
rejected. 
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The restriction contained in clause 7.1, that the sick child must be suffering from a 
familial single gene or sex-linked disorder, is not only unjustified, it is reductio ad 
absurdum when clause 7.5 is taken into consideration. The criteria set out in the 
Guidelines are cumulative; hence, all of the criteria specified must be present before 
approval may be given by ECART. Clause 7.5 permits HLA tissue typing when, 
in addition to the other requirements, the embryo is at risk of being affected by a 
familial single gene disorder or a familial sex-linked disorder for which a PGD test is 
available. Consequently, if a prospective child is at risk of inheriting a disorder such 
as cystic fibrosis, and an existing sibling is suffering from a non-heritable condition 
which could be cured by HSCT, HLA tissue typing may not be performed because 
the life-threatening condition of the sick sibling is not genetic in origin as required 
by clause 7.1. This is the case even though PGD to diagnose cystic fibrosis may be 
performed as an established procedure.
There is a remote possibility that parents with a healthy child may want to undergo 
PGD with HLA tissue typing to conceive an HLA-compatible sibling, in the absence 
of any disorder, to create a family in which the children could serve as mutual donors 
if ever necessary. In this context there is ‘reciprocity of opportunity and obligation, 
unlike the situation in which the first-born was already ill’.164 What if such couples are 
sufficiently wealthy to pay for treatment and are willing to accept the risks involved 
with the procedure? 
At least one commentator is of the view that, based on considerations regarding the 
risks of PGD and the welfare of the donor, we have no good reason to object as ‘we 
already accept the risks of PGD in order to benefit people with the desire for a child, 
and the child will certainly be created for its own sake, since its use as a donor is 
only conditional’.165 Yet there seems to be a relevant distinction to be made in the 
case where there is no threat to the life of a sibling. Relevant factors include the risks 
associated with IVF babies which may utilise additional public resources. Aggressive 
ovarian hyperstimulation regimes will potentially be required, so that there are 
sufficient ova to be fertilised from which to obtain a match, which confers health risks 
for the woman involved.166 It would also be harder to maintain arguments relating to 
‘designer babies’ and ‘slippery slopes’ in this context. 
Conversely, selection on the basis of HLA compatibility could be construed as 
falling within the domain of preventative medicine and, on these grounds, could be 
argued to be acceptable. Yet the chances of children needing an HSC or solid organ 
transplant in their lifetime are not high unless they have a particular genetic history. 
Additionally, there is no positive right to treatment. A fertility services provider is at 
liberty to decline to provide a procedure.167 Because of this, performing the procedure 
in these circumstances has a low value, apart from gratifying parental preferences, 
and less justification is required for restricting such an endeavour. 
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3.4.2.1  Summary
The current prohibition of HLA tissue typing in the absence of a heritable disorder 
is not morally or legally justifiable on the grounds of lack of benefit to the future 
child. The benefits which derive from HLA tissue typing are selection itself, which 
is the same whether there is the risk of transmitting a genetic disorder or not, and 
the potential benefits which may accrue to the family as a whole. In the absence of 
empirical evidence indicating that embryo biopsy is harmful to the prospective child, 
public policy which precludes a therapy by which a sibling’s life may be preserved is 
exceedingly difficult to justify and appears to make an arbitrary distinction. 
PGD with HLA tissue typing and HSC transplant should only be considered when 
the sick sibling has a disorder which is serious or life threatening and there is a 
reasonable chance that HSC transplant will be successful. This acknowledges the 
concerns in relation to the donor child. In this context, ‘serious’ should be interpreted 
as sufficiently serious to justify the clinical risks to the recipient in undergoing the 
transplant. These risks include the treatment regime prior to transplant, which may 
involve ablative chemotherapy and total body irradiation ‘to destroy disease and 
prevent the rejection of donor cells’, and the post-operative risks such as graft-versus-
host disease, infection and relapse.168
3.4.3  Clause 7.2 
No other possibilities for treatment or sources of tissue are available 
Clause 7.2 restricts HLA tissue typing to circumstances where there are no other 
possibilities for treatment or sources of tissue available. It suggests that all other 
avenues for treatment must be exhausted before considering the conception of an 
HLA-matched sibling with the aid of PGD, effectively making it a last-resort therapy. 
The high threshold is not problematic in instances where there is no alternative 
effective clinical course available, such as in the case of Fanconi anaemia.169 However, 
other diseases may not be as straightforward. 
The provision which requires that HSCT should not be performed where there 
is an alternative treatment available is prima facie defensible. Many children with 
serious stem cell defects can be successfully treated without HSC transplantation.170 
For example, bone marrow transplantation for childhood acute leukaemias, such 
as acute lymphoid leukaemia (ALL) and acute myeloid leukaemia (AML), may not 
necessarily be required because treatment with chemotherapy alone has an 80 per 
cent five-year cure rate in children with ALL and 60 per cent in children with AML.171 
Stem cell transplant for children with a first remission is ‘generally considered only 
for those at high risk’, as results for transplantation are claimed to be less successful 
than those for chemotherapy alone.172 
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However, some sick children who are not in immediate need of a transplant may 
require transplant in the future if their current therapy fails.173 Waiting until a 
child relapses before initiating PGD may mean that the mother has lost valuable 
reproductive time, or that the child may deteriorate in the time taken to conceive 
an HLA-matched sibling. Performing PGD solely to obtain a backup or possible 
donor may seem disproportionate in terms of the technical expertise, personnel 
and cost involved.174 Conversely, a pathological condition exists which, although in 
remission, has a statistical chance of recurring. On balance, it seems difficult to justify 
prohibiting this option when parents desire another child. 
The HFEA considered this issue when it undertook the review of preimplantation 
tissue typing policy in 2004. It found that there was ‘no objection in principle’ to 
applications for HLA tissue typing being considered in the same way both in cases 
when the existing child is not symptomatic but is in remission and when the affected 
child is symptomatic at the time of the application.175 This is a flexible approach, 
which is still guided by the underlying medical condition of the sick child and the 
clinical context. 
3.4.3.1  Summary
The current provision that PGD with HLA tissue typing may only be performed 
when no other possible treatments or sources of tissue are available is unduly 
onerous. Tissue typing should be permitted when HSC transplant from an HLA-
matched sibling constitutes the best clinical option after all other possibilities for 
treatment for the affected child have been explored. However if the parents wish to 
have a subsequent child, their application to perform HLA tissue typing should also 
be considered because of the risk of relapse, even if the affected child has undergone 
successful alternative treatment. 
3.4.4  Clause 7.3 
The planned treatment for the affected child will utilise only the cord blood of 
the donor child 
Clause 7.3 imposes a limit on the extent to which a donor child may provide tissue 
for a sibling. The intuitive fear that an HLA-matched child may be used as spare parts 
is not easily dismissed. Ethicists and experts alike have voiced concerns regarding 
the potential exploitation of the vulnerable neonates and the children they develop 
into.176 Such concerns are articulated in the following:
The donor child is at lifelong risk of exploitation, of being told that he or she 
exists as an insurance policy and tissue source for the sibling, of being repeatedly 
subjected to testing and harvesting procedures, of being used this way no matter 
how severe the psychological and physical burden, and of being pressured, 
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manipulated, or even forced over protest. The parents must intend to rear the 
donor child lovingly with that child’s individual best interests governing all 
medical decisions for the child.177 
However, clause 7.3 is problematic both procedurally and substantively. Guidelines 
promulgated pursuant to the HART Act 2004 may legitimately regulate assisted 
reproductive procedures. Conversely, procedures which do not constitute an assisted 
reproductive procedure, such as sibling bone marrow transplant undertaken after 
the birth of a child or, for that matter, the donation of cord blood postnatally, are not 
within the scope of the policy-making authority conferred under the Act. However, 
the purpose of HLA tissue typing is relevant to procedures performed under the 
HART Act 2004. The relevant purpose of HLA tissue typing is to determine whether 
a prospective child is a tissue match for a seriously ill sibling and could act as a tissue 
donor. But restricting procedures performed after birth is outside the scope of the 
authority conferred on ACART or ECART by the Act. Clause 7.3 seems to be ultra 
vires the Act.178 Setting aside the vires issue, the question is whether it is appropriate to 
limit to cord blood only the future donation by the HLA-matched child. It is argued 
that such a restriction is not justified and is not consistent with existing law and 
practice in relation to naturally conceived children. 
Because of these legitimate concerns regarding exploitation, it is impossible to address 
in isolation the issue of the creation of children who are compatible tissue matches 
and cord blood donors for seriously ill siblings. The enduring concern that a saviour 
sibling may be an ongoing source of tissue for a sick child means that this analysis 
necessarily requires a review of the ethics and law in respect of the donation of tissue 
and organs by an incompetent minor to a sick sibling. It is necessary to consider the 
donation of both regenerative and non-regenerative tissue by incompetent children 
to siblings. This analysis focuses on whether, as a matter of law, babies born as saviour 
siblings may provide bone marrow or non-regenerative organs to sick siblings. 
3.4.4.1  Altruistic sibling donation of bone marrow by incompetent minors on the basis of  
 parental (proxy) consent
3.4.4.1.1  Introduction
It is worth noting at the outset of this section a submission NECAHR (the body 
responsible for drafting the Guidelines on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis) 
received from the Health and Disability Commission when it undertook the public 
consultation on the Guidelines. The Health and Disability Commission is required 
under the Health and Disability Commissioner (HDC) Act 1994 to make public 
statements in relation to any matter affecting the rights of health and disability 
services consumers, and consequently provided a submission on the Guidelines.179 
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Whilst it appeared to accept that creating an HLA-compatible child was justifiable in 
some circumstances, based on the medical health of the family, strong support was 
given in the submission for restraining the future donation of tissue from the donor 
child. The submission opined that the regulatory body should 
predicate its approval [for PGD in conjunction with HLA tissue typing] upon 
assurance from the family and the clinic that only cord blood (and not other 
tissues or organs) of the new child will be used to treat the ill sibling.180 
It was stated in the submission, uncontroversially, that the HDC Act 1994 and the 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights apply to children resulting 
from PGD.181 Although not a person for the purposes of the Act or the Code at the 
time PGD is performed, the child born as a result of PGD is a health consumer as 
defined in the HDC Act 1994. Right 2 of the Code confers on health consumers 
the right to be free from discrimination, coercion, harassment and exploitation, and 
right 3 confers the right to dignity and independence. It was claimed that, taken 
together, rights 2 and 3 would prohibit the subjection of a patient below the age of 
consent to surgery for the benefit of another. This aspect of the submission is open to 
the challenge that the legal basis for the recommended restraint is questionable. 
There are no specific legislative provisions governing children acting as tissue 
or organ donors for siblings in New Zealand, nor has this issue come before the 
Courts.182 However, section 16(1) of the Care of Children (CoC) Act 2004 provides 
that ‘the duties, powers, rights, and responsibilities of a guardian of a child include 
(without limitation) the guardian’s – (a) having the role of providing day-to-day care 
for the child … ; and (b) contributing to the child’s intellectual, emotional, physical, 
social, cultural, and other personal development; and (c) determining for or with the 
child, or helping the child to determine, questions about important matters affecting 
the child’. ‘Important matters affecting the child’ include medical treatment for the 
child (if that medical treatment is not routine in nature).183 Consequently, guardians 
have the power to determine important matters affecting the child; and, specifically, 
they have the right and responsibility to determine questions regarding non-routine 
medical treatment. 
Section 36(3)(a) of the CoC Act 2004 provides that, where consent to any medical, 
surgical, or dental treatment or procedure is necessary or sufficient, consent may be 
given by a guardian. The parental right to make decisions regarding medical treatment 
or procedures has long been part of the common law, but it is not absolute.184 However, 
the scope of parental power, and the point at which a Court will find that a decision is 
beyond the ambit of parental authority, differs between jurisdictions.185
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It seems that the provision of proxy consent for bone marrow donation by an 
incompetent minor to a sibling has been viewed as coming within the scope of ordinary 
parental decision-making authority since sibling bone marrow transplants were first 
performed in New Zealand. The same has been true in some other jurisdictions, 
such as the United Kingdom; however this has changed to a certain extent with the 
introduction of the English Human Tissue (HT) Act 2004.
The HT Act 2004 came into force in September 2006. Under the Act, the Human 
Tissue Authority (HTA) is responsible for approving the transplantation of solid 
organs, bone marrow and peripheral blood stem cells from living donors.186 The 
HTA has statutory authority to issue Codes of Practice to provide guidance and 
standards for persons performing functions within its remit.187 Such a Code has 
been released with regard to the donation of allogeneic bone marrow and peripheral 
blood stem cells (PBSC) for transplantation.188 It has introduced new safeguards for 
incompetent minors. Whilst a guardian may provide consent for an incompetent 
minor, bone marrow donation may only be performed if the HTA and an accredited 
assessor are satisfied that the best interests of the child have been properly considered 
and the HTA’s code of practice has been properly implemented.189 The assessor is 
responsible for interviewing the child and guardian, and acts as an advocate for the 
child. Following this a report must be submitted to the HTA stating that the assessor 
is satisfied that:
• the senior clinician has taken all reasonable steps to ensure that a suitable adult 
donor is not available;
• the best interests of the donor have been properly considered; 
• where appropriate, the child has received all the necessary information in a way 
they are most able to understand;
• the senior clinician has explained to the person who has parental responsibility 
for the child the nature of the medical procedure in question, the risks involved 
and any other wider implications. This report should include the information 
given as to the nature of the procedure and the risks involved, the full name 
of the registered medical practitioner and their qualification to give this 
information; 
• the person with parental responsibility understands the nature of the medical 
procedure in question, including the risks and the possible after-effects, has the 
capacity to consent, and consents to the removal of the bone marrow or PBSC;
• the consent has been obtained from the person who has parental responsibility 
for the child; 
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• the consent was not obtained by duress or coercion or the offer of any other 
inducement; 
• there is no evidence of an offer of reward; 
• the person with parental responsibility understands that they are entitled to 
withdraw consent at any time and understands the consequences of withdrawal 
for the recipient;
• there were no difficulties in communicating with the person with parental 
responsibility.190
The report is valid for six months. Whilst there is no criminal sanction for breaching 
the Code of Practice, any breach may be taken into account in decisions regarding 
licensing. If the transplant does not occur within the six months, another report 
must be undertaken. 
In Australia, the donation of regenerative tissue such as bone marrow by a minor to 
an immediate family member is generally covered by statutory provisions, and the 
requirements vary amongst the different States and Territories.191 
In New Zealand, bone marrow donation by an incompetent minor is not specifically 
regulated, but is governed by the general law regarding consent for medical procedures 
on incompetent minors, i.e. the CoC Act 2004, the common law and the Code of 
Consumers’ Rights. Right 7(1) of the Code of Consumers’ Rights provides that 
‘services may be provided to a consumer only if that consumer makes an informed 
choice and gives informed consent, except where any enactment, or the common 
law, or any other provision of this Code provides otherwise. Clause 4 of the Code 
provides that, for the purposes of right 7(1), ‘consumer’ includes a person entitled 
to give consent on behalf of that consumer, which encompasses parents who are 
legally entitled to provide proxy consent for health care procedures performed on 
their minor children. 
Clearly, the Code does not alter the position at law, and guardians may provide proxy 
consent for incompetent minors. The Health and Disability Commission submission 
appears to have been based on an assumption that the donation of bone marrow by 
an incompetent minor to a sick sibling was exploitative, a breach of the dignity of the 
donor child and not capable of being consented to by a guardian. It is significant that 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine countenances 
the donation of regenerative tissue by a minor to a sibling suffering a life-threatening 
condition where there is no other competent available donor.192 
It is argued that the Health and Disability Commission submission was flawed and 
does not represent the legal position in New Zealand. There is, as yet, no judicial or 
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legislative statement that providing proxy consent to sibling bone marrow donation 
is beyond the scope of parental authority. However, parental consent to a medical 
procedure on a minor can be challenged by any eligible person under the CoC Act 
2004.193 If donation is not in the best interests of the child, the Court has powers 
under the CoC Act 2004 to place the child under the guardianship of the Court and 
to appoint an agent of the Court.194 Alternatively, an application may be made to the 
Family or District Courts under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
1989 for a declaration that a child is in need of care and protection.195 The Court may 
then make a guardianship order.196 
This report now examines the common law basis for provision of proxy consent by 
parents for the donation of tissue by an incompetent minor to a sibling in relation 
to both regenerative and non-regenerative tissue. It considers at the outset the risks 
of bone marrow donation to the donor child. Finally, the question of whether a 
distinction should be made between donation of tissue by neonates and donation by 
older children will be addressed.
3.4.4.1.2  Physical and psychological risks associated with sibling bone marrow donation  
 by incompetent minors
Prior to bone marrow donation, pre-harvest screening tests must be undertaken to 
determine whether a child is HLA compatible with the sick sibling. In the case of 
HLA compatibility, bone marrow aspiration is performed under general anaesthesia. 
Because anaesthesia is required, bone marrow donation poses more than a minimal 
physical risk to a donor child. This risk is heightened to an extent if a blood transfusion 
is required as part of the procedure. 
Pain and fatigue are the most common symptoms described by donors after donation 
of bone marrow. However, bone marrow regenerates in approximately three weeks. 
It is reported that minor complications occur in between 6 per cent to 20 per cent of 
bone marrow donations, with serious complications in 0.1 per cent to 0.3 per cent.197 
In the case of paediatric donation serious complications are rare, but children are 
more likely than adults to receive a blood transfusion.198 
One small study which looked at the psychosocial impact of bone marrow donation 
by siblings cautiously indicated that the psychological effect on a bone marrow donor 
is significantly affected by whether the HSCT is successful or not.199 Whilst almost all 
sibling donors who participated in a successful HSCT believed that the donation 
had had a mostly positive impact on their lives, this theme emerged to a much 
smaller extent with those siblings who participated in an unsuccessful transplant. 
Siblings often felt responsible for the death of their sibling when the transplant was 
unsuccessful. All donors reported that the psychological burden of being a donor was 
greater than the physical aspect of undergoing the procedure. The study highlighted 
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the importance of providing children with developmentally appropriate, accurate 
information and psychological support.200 Another study, which looked at the 
psychosocial impact on siblings of children who underwent successful bone marrow 
transplant, found symptoms of post-traumatic stress in both donor and nondonor 
siblings.201 The study emphasised the need for ongoing research and support for both 
donor and nondonor siblings.
It has been argued that, when balancing the harms and benefits involved in sibling 
bone marrow donation, if the ‘minimal risks affecting the donor are compensated, 
according to a reasonable prediction, by significant potential benefits for the recipient-
patient’ … then compliance with the ethical principle of nonmaleficence is achieved.202 
Consequently, paediatric bone marrow transplantation ‘has been confirmed as an 
ethical practice, because its benefits abundantly prevail over its costs and risks’.203 
However, if the physical risk to the donor of bone marrow is substantially greater than 
minimal, harvesting should not be permitted unless that risk may be ameliorated. 
3.4.4.1.3  Justification for parental (proxy) consent to altruistic sibling bone marrow   
 donation by incompetent minors
It has traditionally been argued that parental consent to sibling bone marrow donation 
may be justified on the grounds that it is in the best interests of the child to donate.204 
(However, it should be noted that section 36 of the CoC Act 2004, which authorises 
proxy consent by a guardian when such consent is necessary and sufficient, does not 
specify best interests.) 
There is increasing criticism of the use of the best interests standard in the context of 
sibling donation. It seems to be widely perceived as inaccurate to view a procedure 
which poses some risks and confers no physical therapeutic benefit to be in the best 
interests of the donor child. However, a broad approach to the best interests test may 
be applied. Such an approach has been adopted by the High Court in the United 
Kingdom, authorising the performance of blood tests and bone marrow harvesting 
on a mentally incapacitated adult for the benefit of her sister. It was held that the best 
interests standard included both physical and psychosocial interests.205 Similarly, a 
wider construction of the best interests standard arguably includes the ‘benefits the 
child receives when he or she makes a contribution to the welfare of another person 
to whom he or she stands in an intimate relationship’.206 In an Australian case it was 
held that consent to bone marrow donation by a nine-year-old boy for the benefit 
of his aunt would be beyond the ordinary scope of parental decision-making. In this 
particular case it was held to be in his best interests because the boy firmly wished to 
be a donor and had a close relationship with his extended family, and the risks were 
small.207 An alternative means of justifying proxy parental consent for sibling bone 
marrow donation is where a procedure is ‘not against the interests’ of the child.208 
7
Some commentators have argued that bone marrow donation by minors to siblings 
should be regulated and parents should be required to apply to a specialised national 
or regional ethics committee to ensure that donation is not against the interests of 
the donor.209 Others believe strongly that legislating is not the appropriate response 
in order to protect the interests of children in this context.210 Rather, parents should 
be made fully cognisant of what is entailed in bone marrow donation for both donor 
and donee, and be motivated to consider the interests of both children.211 
As already indicated, bone marrow donation is not specifically regulated at present, 
and parents may provide proxy consent under the general law governing incompetent 
minors. However, it should be acknowledged that it is not only the donor child’s 
interests which must be considered in this context. A highly relevant clinical question 
is whether the parents are acting in the best interests of the sick child, as well as in 
the best interests of the donor child. This is apparent in the following statement by a 
clinical paediatric oncologist:
… I think a far more compelling issue [than that of putting more constraints 
on bone marrow donations by siblings] is whether a parent is acting in the best 
interest of the ill child who is the potential recipient. Often parents believe a bone 
marrow transplant is the only hope and are compelled to try it even when the 
evidence for success is slim. 
Sometimes paediatric bone marrow recipients suffer immensely because of the 
side effects and complications of a transplant that has almost no chance of success. 
There could usefully be far more scrutiny of the process by which parents make 
the decision for their child to undergo bone marrow transplantation.212
One factor, identified as an important consideration affecting the decision-making of 
parents of seriously ill children, has been described as ‘anticipated decision regret’.213 
Parents need to know that they have done everything possible to save a child, so as not 
to blame themselves later. Some parents may consider that conceiving a saviour sibling 
to provide cord blood or bone marrow is both a parental and medical imperative. 
Parents may be driven to pursue this. Depending on the clinical circumstances, 
however, bone marrow transplant may not be the best course of action.214 Ultimately, 
a provider may not be compelled by parents to provide treatment which is clinically 
inappropriate and contrary to good medical practice.215 When the situation is not as 
clear-cut as this, the matter may need to be resolved in Court.216 
The law currently confers significant latitude on parents to provide proxy consent 
for a child to donate regenerative tissue for a sick sibling. A major factor in this is the 
assumption that parents will sometimes be justified in making decisions which affect 
individuals in a family differently, but which are required to further the interests 
of the entire family.217 However, such latitude is only permissible when the harm is 
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considered to be de minimis and there are contingent benefits to the donor.218 Clearly 
clinicians as well as parents are justified in refusing donation when it is perceived that 
the harms of the procedure are not mitigated by any putative benefits.219 The Code of 
Consumers’ Rights should not be interpreted as precluding parents from providing 
proxy consent for bone marrow donation by an incompetent minor to a sibling with 
a life-threatening illness. However, each case should be judged on its own facts and 
the clinical circumstances.
3.4.4.1.4  Neonates as donors of bone marrow – Is there a distinction? 
In a survey reported in 1996, seven out of fifty-six North American paediatric 
transplantation centres reported that they would not collect bone marrow from infant 
donors under six months old.220 However, most would be prepared to harvest marrow 
from infant donors over the age of six months. Although serious complications are 
rare in the case of paediatric donors, a 1987 study revealed that donor children under 
the age of two are likely to receive blood transfusion.221
It has been argued that neonatal donation of umbilical cord blood (which imposes 
virtually no physical risk) should be distinguished from neonates acting as bone 
marrow donors for a sick sibling. This argument is predicated on both psychological 
and physical grounds. It is claimed that the lack of a close relationship with a sibling 
precludes a presumption of psychological benefit to the neonate donor. Because of 
this, a neonate should not serve as bone marrow donor for a sick sibling.222 Donation 
would have to wait until a sufficiently close relationship developed between the 
siblings, regardless of whether this was too late. 
This claim seems hard to sustain. Generally, it is perceived to be a benefit to have a 
healthy sibling to grow up with. At the very least, an ordinary sibling relationship may 
be assumed if the sick sibling survives. Additionally, it is likely that the saviour child 
will have a happier family life living in an intact family rather than one marred by the 
effects of a sibling’s premature and potentially avoidable death. In addition, in the 
event that the transplant were not successful it would be extremely unlikely that the 
neonate or infant would have any recollection of the events which had taken place. 
Bone marrow donation by an HLA-matched child conceived with the aid of PGD is 
governed by the CoC Act 2004, the common law and the Code of Consumers’ Rights. 
Donation of bone marrow places significantly greater physical burdens on a neonate 
or child than is the case with donation of umbilical cord blood.
Clinical considerations will be highly relevant in determining whether the procedure 
is in the best interests of the child when the donor child is a neonate. However, the 
procedure may be in the best interests of the child as understood in the wider sense 
of the term or at least may not be contrary to the child’s interests. In that case parents 
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may provide proxy consent to bone marrow donation by a child regardless of the 
child’s age. If, on the other hand, the procedure is contrary to the child’s interests, the 
parents’ consent is open to legal challenge. 
3.4.4.1.5  Altruistic donation of non-regenerative organs by incompetent minors
A much more difficult issue in the context of children conceived to be donors is the 
donation and transplant of non-regenerative organs, such as kidneys. Whilst there 
have been no reported cases of incompetent minors acting as kidney donors in New 
Zealand and Australia, this appears to be a result of clinical practice, rather than 
formal policy.223 
The British Medical Association considers that it is inappropriate for incompetent 
minors to donate non-regenerative tissue or organs.224 In contrast, professional 
guidelines in the United States endorse living kidney donation by minors but 
provide strict criteria.225 In Hart v Brown226 a United States Court allowed a seven-
year-old girl to donate a kidney for her identical twin sister.227 In Australia, the only 
jurisdiction that expressly permits donation of non-regenerative tissue from minors 
is the Australian Capital Territory.228 The removal of non-regenerative tissue from 
minors is expressly prohibited in Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia and 
is arguably prohibited by implication in the three remaining Australian States.229 
Although it has been argued that it is not within the mandate of ACART to determine 
parameters regarding donation of tissue by a child conceived by PGD with HLA 
tissue typing after birth, it is impossible to consider the merits of allowing PGD with 
HLA tissue typing in isolation from the possible long-term sequelae. This was 
expressly acknowledged by the HFEA when revising the guidance on preimplantation 
tissue typing: 
The HFEA does not have the power to impose a condition on a license that 
would prohibit any future attempt to obtain bone marrow, should a cord blood 
donation fail. However, the Authority noted that obtaining bone marrow for 
the treatment of siblings from children from the age of one year was a relatively 
routine treatment strategy where no other matched donor was available. The 
Authority also noted that, under common law, the best interests test applied by the 
courts when considering the type of medical procedures that may be performed 
on a child, is very much higher when such treatment gives no health benefit to 
the child concerned. As such, solid organ donation is extremely unlikely to be 
held to be in a child’s best interest. Having considered typical arrangements for 
decision making with respect to child bone marrow donors, the Authority found 




Because there is ethical scrutiny, by virtue of the Guidelines, of parents wishing 
to conceive an HLA-matched child in New Zealand, external ethical oversight is 
imposed which does not occur with sibling bone marrow donation. Whilst some may 
advocate similar ethical approval of bone marrow donation, these decisions have 
been made by parents and clinicians for many years without incident. Whilst there 
may seem little reason to introduce such regulatory oversight, in the light of scientific 
advances, which mean that children may be born because of their HLA tissue type, it 
may be timely to consider additional safeguards. 
Concerns regarding exploitation are valid but may be accommodated by standards 
of clinical practice, and are not sufficient on their own to justify restricting the 
performance of HLA tissue typing. Good medical practice should dictate that, if a 
cord blood HSCT fails, then HSC transplant using bone marrow is an acceptable 
clinical course, depending on the clinical circumstances of the affected sibling and 
the HLA-matched infant. It would seem inhumane to permit a couple to conceive an 
HLA-matched child, only to draw an arbitrary line regarding donation once the child 
is born. It is also inconsistent with current practice regarding sibling bone marrow 
donation. 
If such a transplant fails, subsequent donation should be a matter of clinical and 
parental judgment. Ideally an appropriately qualified independent advocate should 
be appointed on the donor child’s behalf, as well as a physician who is not responsible 
for the treatment of the affected sibling. 
3.4.5  Clause 7.4 
  The embryo will be a sibling of the affected child
Clause 7.4 limits the potential recipients of umbilical cord blood in the case of an 
intentional HLA tissue match to a sibling.231 However, the question of whether PGD 
in conjunction could or should be performed for the benefit of others, in particular 
a parent, has been raised. 
3.4.5.1  HLA tissue typing for the benefit of a parent
The possibility of conceiving a tissue-matched child to benefit a parent in need of 
an HSC transplant has been raised following reports from the Netherlands that a 
man suffering from leukaemia was a recipient of a successful HSC transplant using 
the cord blood of his infant daughter.232 (A woman who is suffering from a disorder 
which necessitates HSC transplant is unlikely to be sufficiently robust to undergo 
PGD to create an HLA-matched child. Consequently it is assumed that the majority 
of these cases, of which there would not be many, would involve an illness suffered 
by the prospective father.) In addition to ethical concerns regarding the creation of 
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an HLA-matched child for the benefit of a parent, there is doubt whether such a 
procedure is clinically advantageous. 
3.4.5.1.1  Clinical considerations
The small cell dose of HSCs derived from umbilical cord blood has been a major 
limitation in the use of cord blood for allogeneic transplantation in adults.233 The 
transplanted cell dose procured from umbilical cord blood is approximately 10 per 
cent of that obtained from bone marrow transplant, so has usually been limited to 
the treatment of small children.234 Regardless of this, transplantation of umbilical 
cord blood from unrelated donors into adults has been performed worldwide.235 
Currently research is being undertaken into ex vivo expansion of umbilical cord 
blood stem cells to increase the cell dose.236 
Although cord blood transplant into unrelated adults is occurring internationally, the 
chances of creating a child who is an HLA match for a parent are extremely low. The 
HLA genes are located in three clusters on chromosome six; each child has two copies 
of chromosome six, one inherited from the father and one from the mother.237 The 
three HLA gene clusters on each parental chromosome contain multiple HLA genes 
with many individual variants. The HLA markers present on a child’s leukocytes 
are a complex mix of HLA antigens inherited equally from each parent. Since the 
child inherits half of the HLA antigens (haplotype) from one parent and half from 
the other parent, a child will only match half of each parent’s tissue type exactly (a 
haplotype mismatch, or a half match). However, in some very rare instances a child 
can be matched with a parent. 
Because a parent–child match would only be a partial as opposed to a complete 
match, it has been observed that a partial tissue match for the benefit of a parent 
would be ‘more practically achieved by searching existing donor registers than by 
selecting a tissue-matched embryo’.238 However, a complicating factor is that New 
Zealand does not have a public umbilical cord blood bank and adult patients with 
relatively unique mixed ancestry are sometimes impossible to match on the NZ 
Bone Marrow Donor Register, or on Bone Marrow Donors Worldwide.239 There is 
increasing evidence that ‘well collected and stored cord blood units’ can provide 
sufficient HSCs for transplanting adult patients in some instances.240 Because of this, 
it has been observed that it may be appropriate to revisit the arguments in favour 
of establishing a non-profit, public cord blood bank for the altruistic gifting of 
cord blood ‘specifically to meet New Zealand’s unique ethnic needs’.241 Significantly, 
a greater HLA mismatch is tolerated by the recipient when umbilical cord blood 
is used than is tolerated with bone marrow.242 Because of this tolerance for HLA 
incompatibility, it has been recommended that a ‘matched’ cord unit constitute a 
‘4-of-6’ match.243 It is likely that the example from the Netherlands involved a partial 
match in the absence of an unrelated matched donor. 
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3.4.5.1.2  Ethical considerations
Ethical concerns regarding the creation of a donor child for the benefit of a parent 
have been based on the conflict of interest which may arise when a parent, who is 
also the proxy decision-maker for the putative child, is a potential recipient of the 
child’s umbilical cord blood. Welfare concerns include the possibility that the child 
may be born into a family which suffers the bereavement of a parent if the transplant 
is unsuccessful, or that the parent–child relationship will be distorted. Yet it is not 
generally suggested that parents with severe chronic illness, or potentially terminal 
illness, should not conceive children naturally. Rather, it is a matter of personal 
conscience. Some parents have gone to considerable lengths to conceive a child even 
after the death of a spouse.244 It could also be argued that the putative child’s interests 
may be affected more by the health status of a parent than is the case with a sibling. 
However, it has been observed that:
A parent who intends to have a child to save his or her own life cannot expect 
much goodwill from the social environment. Our moral intuitions condemn these 
applications, because of the considerable self-interest of the decision maker. The 
parent should declare him or herself incompetent due to a conflict of interest. 
Nevertheless, the same justification can be offered as for the donation to a sibling. 
The HLA-matched child will be better off, since it will have two healthy parents, 
while its incompatible possible sibling will experience parental death or will grow 
up in a family with a chronically ill parent. The conception of a child as a donor for 
a parent would also be acceptable according to the postnatal test: if an existing child 
in the family would be a suitable donor, it would be judged acceptable to use it as a 
donor of haematopoietic stem cells for a parent. However, we should take our moral 
intuitions into account by appointing an independent guardian who should, even 
more than in other cases, carefully scrutinise parental decision making.245 
Six years ago Dr Paul Serhal of University College Hospital, London announced his 
intention to perform PGD with HLA typing for thalassemia, where the umbilical 
cord HSCs of the child could help cure the father.246 However, this procedure is 
not yet permitted in the United Kingdom. The HFEA originally precluded tissue 
typing for the benefit of a parent on the advice of its Ethics Committee.247 The Ethics 
Committee stated that, in this situation, a parent’s right to consent to donation on 
behalf of an incompetent child donor would be vitiated. However, the suggestion 
that the prospective child would not necessarily be loved or cared for any less was 
acknowledged. When reconsidering the issue three years later, the HFEA simply 
stated that the use of the PGD and HLA tissue typing to produce a donor for a parent 
‘raises distinct and significant issues and recommended that this matter needed 
further consideration’.248
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In support of allowing parents to undertake the procedure where it may help a loved 
one, whether or not it is a sibling, it has been argued that:
In liberal countries, the decision to have children is an area of private life in 
which the state may only intervene to prevent serious harms. Consequently in 
such countries if there is no reason to think the future child will be harmed, 
couples requesting PGD for HLA typing in order to have a donor child should be 
allowed to seek the necessary treatment.249
The Victorian Infertility Treatment Authority provides that PGD in conjunction 
with HLA tissue typing will only be available where the primary intended tissue 
recipient is a sibling; but should a relative have a similar genetic condition, a decision 
about further donation of cord blood or bone marrow resides with the parents of 
the child.250 
3.4.5.1.3  Summary
The chances of achieving an exact tissue match between a child and a parent are 
extremely low. Further, it is unlikely such an umbilical cord blood transplant would 
offer greater chance of success than that which occurs with the transplantation of 
HSCs from an unrelated donor. Consequently, the scientific limitations present a 
considerable barrier to performing this procedure. However, the ethical concerns do 
not appear to be sufficient on their own to justify prohibition. 
In the case of a partial match, cord blood could be used because of the greater 
tolerance of graft-versus-host disease; but subsequent donation of bone marrow or 
tissue would not be possible because of the haplotype mismatch. Significantly, no 
further demands could be placed on the donor child, which eliminates the potential 
for ‘exploitation’. 
Provided that the welfare of the child is promoted and protected by professional standards 
and external oversight of parental decisions, there seems to be little justification for 
denying parents access to this technology if the procedure confers a clinically significant 
chance of recovery. It should be noted that there is no legal impediment to a parent 
being the recipient of cord blood from a naturally conceived child. 
3.4.6  Clause 7.6 
 The health and well-being of the family/whānau has been fully considered
Section 4(a) of the Act requires that the ‘health, safety and dignity of present and 
future generations should be preserved and promoted’.251 The final criterion 
provided in the Guidelines requires a consideration of the health and well-being of 
the family. Taken together, the principle in the Act and the clause in the Guidelines 
place emphasis on the welfare of the family. This arguably augurs towards respecting 
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parental autonomy in decision-making, which in turn promotes the well-being of 
the parents and subsequently of the family as a whole. 
It is well established that transplantation of HSCs from the umbilical cord blood 
of an HLA-matched sibling is currently the best course of treatment for children 
suffering from certain disorders affecting blood cell formation or the immune system. 
Permitting PGD with HLA tissue typing, when the established risks to a donor child 
are no greater than those associated with IVF and there is a reasonable chance of 
success, clearly promotes the health interests of the existing sick child and family and 
consequently the present generation. 
Consideration of the health and well-being of the family requires an acknowledgement 
of the fact that the ordinary give and take of family life necessarily entails that, at 
times, the interests of one child may prevail over another. Parents must balance the 
sometimes-competing interests of their children, and their wider family. The interest 
involved for one child in the current context is the chance to live an ordinary life span. 
Conversely there are understandable but potentially speculative psychological risks 
to the donor child, which must be balanced. However, considerations regarding the 
health and well-being of families/whānau seem to mandate a more liberal approach 
to HLA tissue typing than is currently permitted by the Guidelines.
.  additional justifications for restraint?
Section 4(g) of the Act provides that the different ethical, spiritual and cultural 
perspectives in society should be considered and treated with respect. Although ethical 
perspectives have been encompassed in the preceding analysis, when considering 
the current framework for HLA tissue typing it is also necessary to consider any 
additional arguments for restraint.
3.5.1  Positive (moral) duty on parents
In an era where reference is increasingly made to the ‘rights’ of individuals, it has been 
suggested that it may eventually become accepted that a sick sibling has ‘a positive 
right against its parents that they take proportionate steps’ to provide a saviour 
sibling, and the resulting child has a positive obligation to assist the sick sibling.252 
It is suggested that this web of ‘rights and responsibilities’, which initially appears to 
be an extreme proposal, might not be out of place in a future context if it became 
‘commonplace’ for parents to engage in this technology.253 
It is significant that the language of rights and obligations is associated with moral 
arguments both for prohibiting and permitting use of this technology. However, it is 
increasingly being used in support of permitting creation of saviour siblings. This is 
apparent in the following:
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the argument that the parents have the right and to a certain extent the obligation 
to do what they can to save their child is a major reason for permitting the 
application.254
Another commentator has observed that the decision to have another child in order 
to save an existing child must be a matter of choice; although he ‘would not find it 
difficult to justify imposing a moral obligation in these circumstances’.255
Yet imposing such a moral obligation to undergo PGD with HLA tissue typing fails 
to take into account the physical, psychological and economic burden of performing 
PGD and HLA typing. The comparatively small chances of success and the fact that 
it necessarily involves introducing a new family member into a potentially stressed 
family situation are deterrents with regard to conception of a saviour sibling. Even 
if the creation of saviour siblings were to become more commonplace, it would 
constitute an extreme view that parents who were unwilling to engage in the procedure 
were neglectful, or abdicating their parental responsibility. In addition, the fact that 
parental pressure or coercion may eventuate in a future context is speculative, and 
does not justify the restriction of the procedure in the present. 
3.5.2  Non-medical selection and the slippery slope
It has been claimed that permitting HLA tissue typing will open the floodgates for the 
use of PGD for non-medical purposes.256 However, the slippery slope claim is flawed 
on at least two grounds. The first is that selecting for HLA type is not a frivolous choice 
but one which is directly associated with a serious, life-threatening disease process. 
It may be justified by the direct medical benefit accruing to another individual. As 
Mance LJ observed in the United Kingdom Court of Appeal, there is a distinction 
between performing embryo biopsy for trivial preferences, and performing it in the 
face of compelling medical situations. Tests for HLA compatibility lie conceptually 
between the two poles of ‘good medical reasons’ for tests and testing for ‘purely social 
reasons’, and they 
lie closer in spirit in my view to the former pole than to the latter. There are here 
good medical reasons for screening any embryo, although they do not relate to any 
future child’s health. The concerns to which the authority’s decision … are directed 
are anything but ‘purely social’, relating as they do to the health of a sibling and the 
well-being of the whole family.257
Secondly, it is difficult to see why HLA tissue typing might be permitted, whilst 
selection based on other non-medical characteristics which do not confer a health 
benefit is circumscribed. The permitting of HLA tissue typing where a sick sibling is 
in need of HSCT, as opposed to the permitting of PGD for non-medical purposes, 
offers a vivid moral demarcation. Additionally, any concerns regarding eugenics 
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do not gain traction in this context, as the purpose of the procedure is to cure a 
particular condition, not to eradicate a disease from the human gene pool.258 Slippery 
slope arguments verge on the irrational, and do not warrant limiting this technology 
given the purpose of the procedure. 
3.5.3  Saviour foetuses
A possible ethical concern in this context is the hypothetical use of an aborted foetus as 
a source of HSCs for transplantation. The same HSCs that are present in an umbilical 
cord at birth are present in the liver of a sixteen-week foetus, and could theoretically 
be used to provide a HSCT for a sick sibling.259 In the United States couples have 
enquired about conceiving an HLA-matched child and then undergoing an induced 
abortion to harvest the HSCs.260 Harvesting stem cells from an aborted foetus is 
illegal under federal law in the United States.261 At present there is no applicable law 
in New Zealand regarding the use of tissue or organs from an aborted foetus, and it 
is thus not directly prohibited.262 
Although conception for termination and donation might generally run counter to 
moral intuitions, it may be a rational course of action for parents of a seriously ill 
child. It is potentially stressful to introduce a new baby into a family already coping 
with a seriously ill child. A family may wish to save their existing child, but not wish 
to extend their family at that particular time. Arguably, conception for termination 
may avoid problems if the transplant fails, as the child is not born into a grieving 
family, and will not feel guilt for the HSCT failure. Additionally, there is no child to 
‘exploit’ for further tissue. One commentator has stated that this approach, which 
effectively avoids the birth of a child, may be ‘one way to remove all doubts about 
respect for future persons’. If HSCs can be harvested before viability, ‘problems of 
commodification and instrumentalisation of persons’ do not apply.263
There has been very little discussion about conception for donation after 
termination.264 It seems that clinicians and ethicists consider it to be, at the very 
least, ethically unacceptable, or even morally repugnant. This moral perturbation 
stems from the fact that terminations occur in the main because pregnancy is an 
unintended and unwanted occurrence of ordinary social life. In contrast, PGD and 
HLA tissue typing require considerable effort, resources and time. If this process 
were proposed, not for the purpose of implanting and developing a healthy foetus, 
but in order to terminate the foetus and harvest tissue, the nature and quality of the 
activity would change. 
In the absence of foetal abnormality, an abortion during the first twenty weeks of 
gestation is rendered lawful if continuing the pregnancy would result in serious 
danger to the life, or the physical or mental health of the woman.265 In circumstances 
where a healthy foetus is intentionally conceived it is difficult then to claim that 
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termination is required for the mental well-being of the woman, particularly in the 
case of a late, second trimester abortion. 
Performing HLA tissue typing on embryos necessarily requires the creation and 
destruction of embryos which are not a suitable match, or which are affected by a 
serious genetic disorder. Whilst destroying embryos is not a morally neutral act, it 
has been generally accepted as justifiable in the face of preventing or treating serious 
disease. However, a foetus is attributed a greater moral status which progressively 
increases the more developed it becomes, and it is a greater leap to justify a late 
termination. 
.  other jurisdictions 
New Zealand is not alone in addressing the saviour sibling issue. Consequently, it 
is worth considering the approach taken to the issue of saviour siblings in other 
jurisdictions. 
3.6.1  Norway
PGD and HLA tissue typing became topical in Norway when the story of six-year-old 
Turkish boy, Mehmet Yildiz, was reported in the media.266 Mehmet suffers from the 
genetic disorder, beta thalassaemia major. The only curative treatment for the disease 
is HSCT from a related HLA-compatible donor which has a success rate reported to 
be above 90 per cent. 
According to legislation which came into force in January 2004, PGD is restricted 
in Norway to serious, X-linked diseases where there are no other possibilities for 
treatment.267 As thalassaemia is an autosomal recessive condition, it did not come 
within the indications for PGD; nor was HLA tissue typing permitted under the Act. 
Mehmet’s case was televised a month after the Act came into force. The underlying 
message of the broadcast was that, without HSCT, Mehmet’s condition was terminal. 
After the programme screened, the Progressive Party called for a law change that would 
permit children with serious diseases in need of HSCT to have access to treatment, 
regardless of the origin of the disorder. The Progressive Party subsequently proposed 
a Bill which would have amended the Biotechnology Act of 5 December 2003, but 
which was strongly opposed by the Minister of Health. 
The Socialist Leftist Party, which had supported the Government coalition in the 
parliamentary debates on the legislation, came under heavy pressure to change its 
stance on PGD. It subsequently proposed an exemption to the ban on PGD if and 
when ‘particular considerations speak in favour of a case’. The reference to ‘particular 
considerations’ meant the ‘presence, or the risk, of serious genetic disease without 
treatment possibilities’. An independent medical Ethics Committee was empowered 
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to grant the exemption and to evaluate individual applications for the performance 
of PGD to conceive a child unaffected by a serious genetic disorder, as well as to 
evaluate the use of HLA typing to conceive a compatible donor for a sibling suffering 
from a genetic disorder. A Bill was passed to incorporate these amendments in May 
of 2004. (It would have been interesting to see if the outcome had been the same if 
Mehmet’s illness were not genetic in origin.)
It was claimed that the Socialist Leftist Party changed its position for several reasons. 
These included not only the pressure exerted by the media campaign but also the fact 
that the restrictive policy was not able to be defended in the face of its ‘first reality 
test’ and the better arguments made in the ensuing debate.268 It is important that the 
New Zealand policy regarding HLA tissue typing is sufficiently robust to withstand 
its first ‘reality test’.269 
3.6.2  Netherlands
The Health Council of the Netherlands (an independent scientific advisory body 
whose task it is to advise Ministers and Parliament in the field of public health) 
recently advised that the life-threatening nature of a disease can justify HLA tissue 
typing in cases where parents are able to love and nurture the child. The Council 
also observed that whether or not the condition of the affected child is hereditary is 
not of critical importance. Selection has an indirect medical motive: the curing of 
the sibling.270 The Secretary of State, however, did not endorse this advice, and PGD 
carried out in the absence of a genetic risk to the embryo remains prohibited in the 
Netherlands.271
3.6.3  Denmark
In Denmark, PGD is permitted if there is a risk of transmission of a serious genetic 
disorder.272 In 2004, an amendment was passed which permits PGD and selection 
on the basis of HLA tissue type.273 Under this provision the Minister of Health may 
authorise PGD with HLA tissue typing where a compatible donor is required for a 
sibling suffering from a serious disease.274 It is not a requirement that the disease 
suffered by the affected child is hereditary.
3.6.4  Sweden
In Sweden PGD is regulated by guidelines promulgated by the Government and 
Parliament and is restricted to diagnosing severe, progressively developing hereditary 
disorders which could lead to early death and for which there is no available 
treatment.275 The Committee on Genetic Integrity has not yet come to a decision 
regarding tissue typing.
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3.6.5  Victoria, Australia
The Victorian Infertility Treatment Authority (ITA) restricts the performance of 
HLA tissue typing to circumstances in which the existing child has a severe or life-
threatening genetic disease.276 However the Victorian Infertility Treatment Act 1995 
only permits access to assisted reproductive services in the case of infertility, or where 
there is a risk of transmission of a genetic disorder. This restricts the discretion of the 
ITA to permit HLA tissue typing in the absence of a genetic risk to the prospective 
child.277 The New Zealand policy body is not restricted in the same way. The ITA 
Guidance provides that the resulting child, born as a result of the procedure, should 
only provide cord blood or bone marrow, and stipulates that the harvesting of ‘hard’ 
or non-regenerative organs is not acceptable.278
3.6.6  United Kingdom
HLA tissue typing is approved by the HFEA on a case-by-case basis. Applications 
are expected to demonstrate that all possible alternative treatments have been 
investigated, and to show why preimplantation tissue typing is the preferred option. 
It is expected that tissue typing will only be undertaken for an existing child with a 
serious or life-threatening condition, and this condition is not limited to diseases 
that are genetic in origin.
3.6.7  European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE)
The ESHRE Ethics Task Force has stated that HLA tissue typing is morally justified if 
the potential child’s use as a donor is not the only motive for the parents to have the 
child.279 Performing PGD for the creation of an HLA-matched sibling to cure a sick 
child with a serious non-genetic disease is also deemed acceptable. However, it has 
stated that, given the low chance of success, it may be inappropriate to recommend 
the course of treatment ‘in cases of advanced maternal age and/or poor ovarian 
reserve’.280 ESHRE has also recommended that follow-up should be performed as 
reliable empirical research is required to determine the psychological and social 
consequences for the donor sibling. For this reason, a register should be set up to 
record donations. 
3.6.8  Summary 
The majority of the jurisdictions covered in this brief overview permit the use of 
HLA tissue typing with PGD to conceive an HLA-matched child. Whether the disease 
suffered by the sick sibling is genetic in origin is immaterial in both the United 
Kingdom and Denmark. Proposals to extend HLA tissue typing where there is no 
genetic risk have occurred in two jurisdictions, but have been unsuccessful. Both 
the United Kingdom and Victorian jurisdictions countenance the transplantation of 
bone marrow tissue from a child conceived by PGD and HLA tissue typing.
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.7  Public perceptions
The best justification for State intervention in this context is the concern that 
children may be exploited as donors in violation of their dignity. Yet it is also possible 
that the creation of saviour siblings may be perceived from within a human rights 
framework.281 Within such a rights framework, individuals have ‘positive obligations 
to assist one another’ in some circumstances when they can do so at little or negligible 
cost to themselves.282 There seems to be support for this sentiment in surveys 
undertaken to assess the views of the public. 
In a large survey of Americans, undertaken by the Genetics and Public Policy Centre, 
John Hopkins University, the majority of respondents approved the use of PGD to 
select an embryo that was a match for a sick sibling. Strong support was reported for 
such a technology when it provides a health benefit, even when that benefit accrues 
to another person.283
When reviewing its Guidance on Preimplantation Tissue Typing, the HFEA 
commissioned research into public opinion on issues related to embryo selection 
for tissue typing and sibling cord blood and bone marrow donation.284 A series of 
workshops consisting of six groups comprising six to eight members of the public 
was conducted. Two of these groups had ‘direct interest in either genetic disease or 
assisted conception’. To investigate how public opinion on these issues was formed and 
influenced, these groups met to discuss the issues and to develop their opinions on 
the use of assisted reproductive technologies. The same individuals were then brought 
together, for a half-day workshop with experts, to explore their views further.
It was reported after the initial discussion that participants’ views were ‘broadly in 
favour of the use of any technique which could save the life of a child, as long as the 
risks were well managed’. The majority of participants did not consider it important 
whether the condition suffered by the sick sibling was hereditary. What was important 
was the seriousness of the condition affecting the sick sibling. However, many of the 
participants expressed greater reservations about the use of the procedure to produce a 
bone marrow donor. Reportedly, these views changed after discussion with an expert.
.  conclusion
Parents have been attempting to conceive potential donors for seriously ill siblings 
ever since it was possible to diagnose certain medical conditions and HLA tissue type 
prenatally. The fact that this can be achieved more easily and with greater accuracy 
with the use of PGD does not mean that it should necessarily be integrated into 
mainstream medicine without careful analysis. Whilst the HART Act 2004 seeks to 
secure the benefits of assisted reproductive technology, it is also concerned to protect 
the health, safety, dignity and rights of all individuals in the use of such technologies. 
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The ability to create saviour siblings utilising PGD technology has called into 
question what constitutes responsible parenthood and the legitimate scope of 
parental decision-making authority. It has resulted in the formulation of guidelines, 
which now have legal status under the HART Act 2004.285 This section has analysed 
the risks and benefits of HLA tissue typing, as well as the arguments in favour of and 
against liberalising the current guidelines. It concludes that the current restrictive 
HLA policy is both ethically and legally problematic.
Significant benefits accrue from HLA tissue typing in conjunction with PGD. It is 
widely accepted that transplantation of umbilical cord blood HSCs from an HLA-
matched sibling provides the best chance, or possibly the only chance, of successful 
treatment for children suffering from certain disorders. The physical risks to a donor 
child conceived for this purpose are not high. They comprise the ordinary risks 
associated with IVF and embryo biopsy as well as a relatively small additional risk 
in the case of low birth weight or preterm babies. The psychological sequelae for 
children conceived to be cord blood donors are not yet established. They will only be 
deduced after sufficient time has elapsed for qualitative research to be undertaken. 
In the interim, the issue is whether the concerns outweigh the potential or, in some 
cases, inevitable death of a child. 
The HART Act 2004 requires that the health and well-being of a child born as 
the result of an assisted reproductive procedure is an important consideration in 
all decisions about that procedure; but it is not a paramount consideration, nor is 
it the only consideration. Equally, the Act requires that the human health, safety 
and dignity of present and future generations should be preserved and promoted. 
Permitting parents to conceive an HLA-compatible sibling provides a seriously ill 
child with a chance of disease-free survival. This clearly promotes the health of the 
existing child and the well-being of the family and, potentially, the next generation. 
These principles and the first purpose of the Act support reproductive liberty and 
provide strong support for a less restrictive policy. 
The Act also requires that the different ethical perspectives in society should be 
considered and treated with respect. Concerns regarding responsible parenthood 
and instrumentalisation of the donor child are insufficient to displace the interests 
of parents who wish to undertake this clinical course when there is a reasonable 
chance of success, and the interests of the sick child who will have an opportunity for 
survival. Conception of a child to be a donor is no worse or less altruistic than the 
multitude of other reasons for conception of a child. Indeed, the decision to conceive 
a child who may provide HSCs for a sick sibling perhaps constitutes one of the more 
rational reasons for conceiving a child. 
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Concerns that a donor child may face ongoing requests for donation are valid, but 
may be managed by standards of clinical practice. They are not sufficient on their own 
to justify restricting the performance of HLA tissue typing. Slippery slope arguments 
are weak and fail to provide sufficient justification for limiting HLA tissue typing 
given the purpose of the procedure. Whilst there may be ethical concerns for the 
welfare of donor children, which mandate caution, what can be said is that: 
it is far from obvious that considerations of child welfare should count against, 
rather than for, the practice of saviour sibling selection.286 
It has been argued on a clause-by-clause basis that the Guidelines are problematic, 
and require revision. There is no good reason to restrict HLA tissue typing to 
circumstances where the sick child is suffering from a single gene or sex-linked 
disorder, as there is no valid moral distinction between performing PGD and HLA 
tissue typing in the presence or absence of a genetic risk. The Guidelines should simply 
require that the sick sibling is suffering from, or has suffered from, a condition which is 
serious or life threatening.
The restriction, which limits performance of PGD with HLA tissue typing to situations 
where there are no other possibilities for treatment or sources of tissue available, is 
unduly onerous. Cord blood registries may contain a reasonable match for the sick 
child in some cases, but a sibling HLA match may constitute the best chance of a 
successful outcome. In addition, parents may wish to conceive a donor child in the 
event that the therapy currently being undertaken by the sick child is unsuccessful. It 
would be preferable to require that ‘all other possibilities of treatment and sources of 
tissue for the affected child have been explored’.
Finally, whilst the purpose of conceiving an HLA-matched child is relevant to 
decision-making under the Act, it is not within the jurisdiction of ACART to impose 
limits on tissue donation after a child is born. Sibling bone marrow donation has 
occurred with naturally conceived children who are an HLA match with a sick sibling 
in accordance with the general law regarding incompetent minors. It is argued here 
that there is no relevant moral objection to permitting bone marrow donation if 
a cord blood HSC transplant fails, or is unable to be performed. This should be a 
matter for parental and clinical decision-making, taking into account the clinical 
circumstances of the infant or child and the sick sibling, and based on the usual legal 
standard for the provision of proxy consent. There does not appear to be any evidence 
that deference to parental autonomy in relation to providing proxy consent to bone 
marrow transplantation has led to an inappropriate exercise of parental authority 
in the past. However, good medical practice should dictate that the donor child has 
an independent physician and an appropriately qualified independent advocate who 
may act on the child’s behalf. Whenever there is doubt regarding the appropriateness 
of the procedure, the jurisdiction of the Family Court should be invoked. 
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It is manifestly reasonable to state that good medical practice would dictate a limit 
to the number and type of procedures which may be performed on an incompetent 
saviour sibling for the benefit of a sick child.287 However, imposing a precise limit 
may be an arbitrary restriction. It may be of greater value to appoint a professional 
advocate for a child, such as a child psychologist, who is able to communicate with 
the child and is independent of the parents and the physicians. Such an appointment 
may best achieve the protection and promotion of the donor child’s interests. In the 
case of disagreement, any eligible persons involved should apply to the Court for 
determination. 
Introducing a register to record all those children born as a result of preimplantation 
HLA tissue typing, and to record subsequent tissue donations, is imperative so that 
empirical studies may be undertaken on the effects on donor children which may 
inform subsequent policy-making.
.9  summary of conclusions
3.9.1  Policy
Conception of a child who may provide cord blood or bone marrow for a sick sibling 
should be permitted where as well as wanting a donor child the child is wanted in its 
own right and:
1 The sick sibling is suffering from, or has suffered from, a condition which is 
serious or life threatening, and
2 All other possibilities of treatment and sources of tissue for the affected child 
have been explored, and 
3 HSC transplant confers a reasonable chance of disease-free survival for the 
recipient sibling.
4 Cord or bone marrow donation may be performed on the basis of proxy 
parental consent when it is consistent with the current law. However, in the 
event that ongoing demands for donation are made, good medical practice 
requires the appointment of an appropriately qualified independent advocate 
for the child, and an independent physician.
3.9.2  Governance
A register should be set up by the Ministry of Health to record the birth of all 
children born from PGD with HLA tissue typing, and to record subsequent tissue 
donation. Parents must agree to participate in follow-up studies if and when they are 
undertaken.
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Figure 1: Conditions for which HSCT may be indicated
Source: K. Moise, ‘Umbilical Cord Stem Cells’ (2005) 106 Obstetrics & Gynecology 
1393, 1394 
*  Personal communications: Mark Walters, MD, of Children’s Hospital Oakland Research Institute and Joanne Kurtzberg, MD,  
 Director  Carolinas Cord Blood Bank at Duke
Thalassemias 
•  a-thalassemia intermedia (hemoglobin H  
 disease) 
•  a-thalassemia major (hydrops fetalis) 
•  ß-thalassemia major (Cooley’s anemia) 
•  ß-thalassemia intermedia 
•  E-ß° thalassemia 
•  E-ß+ thalassemia 
Sickle Cell disorders 
•  Sickle cell anemia (hemoglobin SS)
•  HbSC disease 
•  Sickle ß° thalassemia 
•  Sickle ß+ thalassemia 
Oncologic Disorders 
•  Acute lymphoblastic leukemia 
•  Acute myeloid leukemia 
•  Chronic myeloid leukemia 
•  Autoimmune lymphoproliferative syndrome 
•  Burkitt lymphoma 
•  Cytopenia related to monosomy 7 
•  Familial histocytosis 
•  Juvenile myelomonocytic leukemia 
•  Hemophagocytic lymphohistiocytosis 
•  Hodgkin’s disease 
•  Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma 
•  Langerhans cell histiocytosis 
•  Lymphatoid granulomatosis 
•  Myelodysplasia syndrome 
Hematologic Disorders 
•  Amegakaryocytic thrombocytopenia 
•  Autoimmune neutropenia (severe) 
•  Congenital dyserythropoietic anemia 
•  Cyclic neutropenia 
•  Diamond Blackfan anemia 
•  Evan’s syndrome 
•  Fanconi anemia 
•  Glanzmann’s disease 
•  Hypoproliferative anemia 
•  Juvenile dermatomyositis 
•  Juvenile xanthogranulomas 
•  Kostmanns syndrome 
•  Pancytopenia 
•  Red cell aplasia 
•  Refractory anemia 
•  Schwachman Syndrome 
•  Severe aplastic anemia 
•  Systemic mastocytosis 
•  Severe neonatal thrombocytopenia 
•  Congenital sideroblastic anemia 
•  Thrombocytopenia with absent radius 
 (TAR syndrome) 
Immune Deficiencies 
•  Ataxia telangectasia 
•  Cartilage-hair hypoplasia 
•  Chronic granulomatous disease 
•  Hypogammaglobulinemia 
•  IKK gamma deficiency 
•  Immune dysregulation polyendocrinopathy 
•  Mucolipidosis, Type II 
•  Myelokathesis 
•  X-linked immunodeficiency 
•  Severe combined immunodeficiency 
•  Adenosine desaminase deficiency 
•  Wiscott-Aldrich syndrome 
•  X-linked agammaglobulinemia 
•  X-linked lymphoproliferative syndrome 
Metabolic Disorders 
•  Adrenoleukodystrophy 
•  Gaucher’s disease (infantile) 
•  Metachromatic leukodystrophy 
•  Globoid cell leukodystrophy (Krabbe   
 disease) 
•  Gunther disease 
•  Hermansky-Pudlak syndrome 
•  Hurler syndrome 
•  Hurler-Scheie syndrome 
•  Hunter Syndrome 
•  Sanfilippo syndrome 
•  Maroteau-Lamy Syndrome 
•  Mucolipidosis Types II, III 
•  Alpha mannosidosis 
•  Neimann Pick Syndrome, types A and B 
•  Sandoff Syndrome 
•  Tay Sachs Disease 
indications for cord Blood transplant
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   PgD anD negative selection oF unaFFecteD 
 carrier emBryos
.1  introduction
The use of PGD to diagnose and select against embryos which are affected by serious 
single gene or chromosomal disorders is permitted as a routine clinical procedure 
by virtue of the HART Order 2005. However, as was observed in the first report of 
the Human Genome Research Project, the position regarding negative selection of 
unaffected carrier embryos is equivocal.288 Embryos which are ‘unaffected’ or ‘healthy’ 
carriers of a genetic mutation have an allele which is associated with a particular 
genetic disorder, but have also inherited a normal allele which is dominant. These 
heterozygote carrier embryos, if implanted and carried successfully to term, will 
not be born with any clinical manifestations of the relevant genetic disorder, but 
will be an unaffected ‘carrier’ of the familial mutation. Individuals who are healthy 
carriers of a heritable mutation do not, with some exceptions, have any phenotypic 
characteristics of the genetic disorder, but are capable of passing on the genetic 
condition to their future offspring. 
The current regulatory scheme restricts the performance of PGD on a strictly 
therapeutic normative basis. PGD may only be performed to prevent the transmission 
of disorders capable of causing serious impairment in a future individual. As yet, the 
established procedures policy does not expressly provide for the negative selection of 
carrier embryos. 
Two developments in particular signal that the issue of preimplantation selection of 
embryos and the status of unaffected carrier embryos will become a significant topic 
in the context of PGD. First, as science provides more choices for genetic selection, it 
also provides better treatment and improved quality of life for people with inherited 
genetic conditions such as haemophilia or cystic fibrosis.289 More people affected by 
serious genetic disorders may now live to reproductive age and beyond. They may 
consider parenthood, and reprogenetic technology, when they might not have done 
so if they had been born even a decade before. Secondly, as PGD technology becomes 
more sophisticated and accurate and is performed more regularly, more embryos 
will be identified as carriers of recessive disorders and prospective parents may want 
a choice as to which are implanted.
This section explores whether the arguments that have been raised against PGD 
simpliciter are enhanced in the case of PGD, which may result in selection against 
healthy carrier embryos. It clarifies at the outset the different implications of being 
a carrier of an X-linked recessive disorder as opposed to being an unaffected carrier 
of an autosomal recessive disorder. The effect of the current New Zealand law in 
relation to the negative selection of carrier embryos is considered, and an overview 
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is provided of other jurisdictions that have considered this issue. Ultimately, this 
section considers who should decide whether carrier embryos may be negatively 
selected, and according to what criteria. 
.2  implications of unaffected carrier status
4.2.1  Genetic implications – Transmission
When selecting against carrier embryos, the genetic condition for which a prospective 
carrier is at risk impacts greatly on the implications of carrier status. Although a 
female carrier of an X-linked recessive disorder such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy 
is unaffected, the risk of passing the disorder on to a future son is 50 per cent. 
In contrast, for a carrier of an autosomal recessive gene (whose reproductive partner 
is not a carrier) the risk of passing on the disorder may only be 1 per cent,290 or even 
less.291 Clearly, the reproductive risk for a carrier of an autosomal recessive condition 
is much lower. Consequently, there is a significant distinction between healthy 
carriers of X-linked recessive conditions and heterozygote carriers of autosomal 
recessive conditions. This factor necessarily affects the nature and quality of negative 
selection in these circumstances. 
4.2.2  Physical implications
Although the issue of carrier status is often referred to in terms of the ‘reproductive 
risk’ for the carrier, it is not merely reproductive interests that are of concern in 
the case of some recessive conditions. It is possible that carriers of certain recessive 
disorders may manifest phenotypic symptoms. An example of this is X-linked 
adrenoleukodystrophy. Although this disorder is inherited in an X-linked pattern, 
carrier females can exhibit symptoms of the condition.292 Such a clinical scenario 
arguably fits within a therapeutic PGD framework, rendering negative selection in 
these circumstances permissible; or at least enhancing the arguments in favour of 
selecting against carrier embryos in this context. 
4.2.3  Psychosocial implications
Construing the interests at stake simply as ‘reproductive interests’, as opposed to 
health interests, may not be a true reflection of the implications of carrier status 
on future individuals, particularly in the case of carriers of X-linked conditions. In 
addition to potentially imposing a physical burden on the prospective carrier, an 
individual’s carrier status may also impose a significant psychological burden. This 
burden rewrites the rules of engagement not only for pregnancy, but also potentially 
the relationships that carrier offspring may develop. 
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4.2.4  Implications of selection when it is a contingent activity versus a primary purpose
There are two possible situations when the issue of selecting against carrier embryos 
using PGD may arise. The first and most likely situation is when PGD is indicated 
because of the risk of passing on a serious hereditary disorder, and selecting against 
carrier embryos becomes a contingent or additional possibility. For the purposes 
of this discussion it will be described as ‘contingent selection’ (i.e. secondary or 
additional selection).
The second possible situation occurs when an individual who is not at risk of having 
an affected child wishes to avoid having a child who will be an unaffected carrier 
child; this will be referred to as ‘primary purpose PGD’. Requests to perform PGD to 
negatively select an unaffected carrier are more likely to occur in the case of X-linked 
recessive conditions where an affected male wishes to avoid passing the mutation 
on to a daughter, who would be at risk of transmitting the disorder to her sons. The 
distinction between selecting against carrier embryos on a contingent basis versus a 
primary basis is made in the following example using the case of haemophilia.
4.2.4.1  PGD and contingent selection against unaffected carriers
A female carrier of haemophilia has a 25 per cent chance of conceiving a son affected 
by haemophilia, and a 25 per cent chance of having a healthy daughter who is a 
carrier of the haemophilia mutation. In this example the possibility of selecting 
against a carrier daughter is a secondary possibility as a result of PGD, which is 
principally performed to avoid the transmission of haemophilia to a son. The possible 
reproductive outcomes for a female carrier of the X-linked disorder haemophilia are 
represented in Table 1:
Pregnancy outcome Probability clinical problems implications for next 
   generation
A 
Male with haemophilia 25 per cent Bleeding tendency, Daughters 50 per cent  
  lifelong therapy risk of being carriers
B 
Healthy Male 25 per cent Nil Nil
C 
Carrier Female 25 per cent 90 per cent healthy, Daughters 50 per cent 
  10 per cent mild  risk of being carriers,   
   bleeding sons 50 per cent risk for  
    haemophilia
D 
Healthy Female 25 per cent Nil Nil
Table 1: Reproductive outcome for a female carrier of X-linked haemophilia
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4.2.4.2  Negative selection of healthy carriers as a primary purpose
The other category entails the utilisation of PGD to avoid the creation of healthy 
carrier offspring as a primary goal. PGD is engaged in solely to deselect a carrier 
embryo. This could occur in the case of a haemophiliac male. He cannot pass the 
mutation on to any prospective sons because it is an X-linked condition. However, 
any prospective daughters will be carriers. In these circumstances PGD is performed 
where there is no risk of transmitting the genetic disorder, but there is a risk of 
transmitting carrier status to female offspring. The possible reproductive outcomes 
in this situation are represented in Table 2:
Pregnancy  Probability  clinical problems implications for next 
outcome   generation  
A Healthy male 50 per cent Nil Nil
B Carrier female 50 per cent 90 per cent healthy, Daughters 50 per cent  
  10 per cent mild risk of being carriers,   
  bleeding sons 50 per cent risk of  
   haemophilia
Table 2: Reproductive outcome for a male affected by haemophilia
There are no reports, as yet, of a demand for PGD where no risk exists of having a 
child affected by a serious genetic disorder, but where there is a risk of transmitting 
carrier status to offspring, i.e. primary purpose PGD. However, the same is not true 
in the case of prenatal diagnosis and X-linked genetic disorders. Requests have been 
made for prenatal diagnosis of carrier status in relation to haemophilia A and fragile 
X syndrome, both X-linked recessive disorders.293 The parents requesting prenatal 
diagnosis were prepared to terminate not only an affected male foetus, but also a female 
foetus if it were diagnosed as a carrier of the particular X-linked recessive disorder. 
As has already been observed, female carriers of X-linked disorders do not generally 
manifest any phenotypic symptoms; only males who inherit the abnormal gene are 
affected. However there are exceptions to this. In some cases females will exhibit 
effects of the X-linked recessive mutation that they are carrying. Approximately 10 
per cent of female carriers of the haemophilia A gene, for example, may display a 
mild bleeding tendency. In the case of fragile X, the most common inherited form 
of mental retardation apart from Down syndrome, carrying a premutation has 
no observable phenotypic impact on female offspring; but female carriers of full 
mutations can be affected.294 Whilst there may be evidence that a female carrier 
foetus of fragile X syndrome will be affected, there is only a small risk that a female 
carrier of haemophilia will be mildly affected.
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It was reported that the motivation of the parents who presented for prenatal 
diagnosis of carrier status was to expunge the haemophilia and fragile X disorders 
from their families.295 Clearly, there is evidence that some prospective parents have 
a strong desire to avoid the transmission of carrier status to their offspring. If being 
a carrier of an X-linked recessive disorder poses a reasonable risk of phenotypic 
manifestations, negative selection of ‘healthy’ carrier embryos may be justified on 
health grounds. However, when carrier status may only pose a risk of a ‘minor’ 
genetic abnormality or no abnormality at all, selection against broadly ‘unaffected’ 
carrier embryos can represent a considerable moral dilemma. 
4.2.5  Summary
There is evidence that some parents would consider termination if a foetus were 
a female carrier of a serious X-linked disorder. With the introduction of PGD, 
avoiding carrier offspring is now possible at the preimplantation stage. When PGD 
has been performed to diagnose serious heritable disorders, and carrier status has 
been determined in the process, it is a matter of debate whether selection on the 
basis of unaffected carrier status should be permitted, and who should decide. A 
more problematic issue is whether PGD should be accessible to parents who are not 
at risk of having offspring affected by a particular serious genetic disorder, but who 
may transmit the recessive allele to the following generation. This analysis considers 
whether negative selection of carrier embryos is permitted under the current legal 
framework and, if not, whether it should be. It concludes that the law is unclear, 
but that there is no principled basis to prevent parents from choosing to avoid 
implantation of carrier embryos.
.  current legal position
In the course of ordinary IVF the embryologist is responsible for selecting the best-
quality embryo or embryos for implantation. This involves selecting the embryo with 
those characteristics conferring the greatest chance of implantation and of being 
successfully carried to term. However, performing PGD for single gene disorders 
brings an additional dimension to embryo selection. This is because some embryos 
will be affected by a single gene disorder, some will be unaffected and some will be 
unaffected carriers of the relevant mutation. Although carrier status is not always 
diagnosed in the course of preimplantation diagnosis, some tests will indicate 
unaffected carriers as an unavoidable by-product of preimplantation testing.
There are two related issues. The first is whether parents have a right to know the 
carrier status of their embryos and second is whether they should be permitted to 
select against carrier embryos.
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The following passage seeks to determine what information parents are entitled to 
receive in the course of PGD. The related issue, whether parents ought to be able to 
select against carrier embryos, will then be considered. 
4.3.1  Right to know
4.3.1.1  Code of Consumers’ Rights
The Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights establishes the civil 
standard for the provision of health services by health care providers to health care 
consumers in New Zealand.296 The Code, promulgated pursuant to the HDC Act 
1994, declares that consumers have rights and providers have duties.297 The Code 
encompasses both providers and consumers of fertility services, and imposes 
extensive information requirements on providers. To determine the relevance of the 
Code to the performance of PGD, it is necessary to unpack not only the rights, but 
also the relevant definitions provided in both the Code and the HDC Act 1994. 
Right 6(1) of the Code provides that ‘every consumer has the right to the information 
that a reasonable consumer, in that consumer’s circumstances, would expect to receive’, 
including the results of tests (6(f)) and the results of procedures (6(g)). (Emphasis 
added.) Clause 4 of the Code provides that a ‘consumer’ is a health consumer. The 
definition of a ‘health consumer’ is provided in section 2 of the HDC Act 1994, which 
declares that a health consumer ‘includes any person on or in respect of whom any 
health care procedure is carried out’. A ‘health care procedure’ is further defined 
as any health treatment, health examination, health teaching or health research 
administered to or carried out on or in respect of any person by any health care 
provider; and includes any provision of health services to any person by any health 
care provider. The definition of ‘health services’ in section 2 of the Act includes 
diagnostic services and fertility services.
Embryo biopsy is clearly a diagnostic procedure, which comes within the meaning of 
a ‘health service’. The question is whether embryo biopsy comes within the definition 
of a ‘health care procedure’. Diagnosing embryos for genetic abnormalities constitutes 
a health examination. The issue is whether it is carried out ‘on or in respect of any 
person by any health care provider’. The embryologist comes within the definition 
of a ‘health care provider’ contained in section 3 of the Act. However, as the embryo 
is not a person, the procedure is not carried out ‘on any person’.298 To come within 
the definition of a health care procedure, the biopsy must be carried out ‘in respect 
of any person’. The biopsy is not carried out on a body part or tissue provided by 
the mother, but on a separate entity created by in vitro fertilisation. In this context, 
it is possible that the embryo biopsy, whilst it is a health service, is not a health care 
procedure carried out on or in respect of any person. Therefore, the right to be fully 
informed of the results of the testing is potentially not triggered under the Code. 
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However, it would be difficult to sustain this line of argument when an embryo 
is selected for transfer. The process of implantation clearly comes within the 
definition of a health care procedure carried out on a health care consumer, with the 
corresponding right under 6(1) of the Code to be fully informed with regards to the 
implantation procedure. On this analysis, the right to be fully informed under the 
Code arises in the context of implantation, but does not necessarily arise as a matter 
of course when the results of embryo biopsy are known. Whether it should arise at 
the point of diagnosis is a moot point.299 
If selection against unaffected carrier embryos is permissible under the established 
procedures order, there may be no reason to refuse disclosure of the information. 
However, if selection against carrier embryos is not permitted under the HART 
Order 2005, it could create significant difficulties for a provider if parents wished 
to know in advance and consequently attempted to influence embryo selection.300 If 
negative selection of unaffected carriers is not permitted, then it is arguable that a 
reasonable consumer in that consumer’s circumstances would not expect to be privy 
to that information at the point of biopsy; but it could be reasonable to expect to be 
informed of carrier status of any embryos selected for implantation. Information 
regarding carrier status of an embryo is health information and is information that a 
reasonable consumer, in that consumer’s circumstances, may expect to receive in the 
course of embryo transfer. 
The caution exercised by clinicians worldwide in relation to the performance of 
carrier testing on minors, and the disclosure of carrier information, may be relevant 
to the disclosure to parents of carrier status determined as a result of PGD. A recent 
systematic review, which examined fourteen guidelines from various jurisdictions, 
revealed that all of the guidelines were unanimous in recommending that carrier 
testing in minors should not be performed, but should be deferred until the child 
could give informed consent to testing.301 It was stated that:
Despite the lack of conclusive evidence that carrier testing performed during 
childhood harms children psychologically,302 the great majority of genetic testing 
guidelines espouse the premise that carrier testing might be detrimental to 
the mental well being of tested children, and as such, should be disallowed in 
children.303
However two bodies, the British Medical Association and the United Kingdom 
Genetic Interest Group, have a more flexible stance regarding the testing of minors. 
In their view, providing information to a minor regarding carrier status could help 
a child to cope with this knowledge from an early age and could ‘reduce the anxiety 
and uncertainty experienced by parents about their child’s carrier status’.304
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When carrier status is discovered incidentally (which may occur in the course of PGD 
or in newborn screening) the British Medical Association guidelines and the American 
Academy of Pediatrics recommend that carrier status results should be conveyed to 
parents. However, the American Medical Association and the German Society of 
Human Genetics recommend that the child’s carrier status should not be disclosed 
to parents or to other third parties.305 They suggest that the information regarding 
carrier status should be ‘discussed with the child when he reaches reproductive 
age’. The American Medical Association guidelines also provide instructions for 
maintaining confidentiality, and state that this ‘privileged information’ should be 
kept separately from a patient’s medical record to avoid inadvertent disclosure. Yet 
it seems that there is a paucity of evidence regarding the beneficial or detrimental 
effects of carrier testing and disclosure to minors. 
4.3.1.2  Summary
As discussed, it is likely that parents may wish to know the carrier status of embryos 
created and implanted in the course of PGD. It seems counter-intuitive to withhold 
information regarding carrier status given the seriousness of the genetic disorders 
involved, and the lack of evidence regarding harm in disclosure of such information. 
However, there is evidence that some organisations recommend not disclosing carrier 
status when it is discovered incidentally. Two organisations, the British Medical 
Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics, provide that disclosure of 
carrier status to parents is acceptable. Given the lack of evidence regarding harm, the 
balance seems to be in favour of informing parents of the carrier status of embryos 
created and embryos transferred for implantation.306
4.3.2  Right to choose
4.3.2.1  Code of Consumers’ Rights
Right 7(1) of the Code provides that ‘services may be provided to a consumer only if 
that consumer makes an informed choice and gives informed consent, except where 
any enactment, or the common law, or any other provision of this Code provides 
otherwise’. Right 7 does not confer on consumers a choice regarding the implantation 
of a non-carrier or carrier embryo if it has been legally precluded by the HART Order 
2005. Right 7 simply maintains a consumers’ right to informed consent as is generally 
required in the health context. It is consequently necessary to determine whether 
negative selection against carrier embryos is permitted under the Order. 
4.3.2.2  Human Assisted Reproductive Technology (HART) Order 2005
The current legal position under the HART Order 2005 is as follows. PGD may be 
performed as an established procedure for familial single gene disorders where the 
disorder has been identified in the family, there is a 25 per cent or greater risk of an 
affected pregnancy and the future individual may be seriously impaired as a result of 
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the disorder. Sex selection is also permitted in the case of familial X-linked disorders 
where there is no specific test for the particular disease-causing mutation available, 
there is a 25 per cent or greater risk of an affected pregnancy and the future individual 
may be seriously impaired as a result of the disorder. PGD which falls within these 
categories may be carried out as a routine clinical procedure. 
4.3.2.2.1  Contingent selection
A rigid interpretation of the established procedures order may suggest that intentional 
selection against healthy carriers in the course of PGD is not permitted because 
positive carrier status is not a serious impairment. However, it could be argued that 
transmission of carrier status is capable of causing serious impairment in a future 
individual in some instances. 
Being a carrier of an X-linked or autosomal recessive disorder undeniably associates 
an unaffected carrier embryo with a particular genetic disorder. However, carriers of 
X-linked conditions are burdened more directly. Female carriers of X-linked recessive 
mutations have a one in two risk that prospective sons will inherit and develop the 
disorder, and a one in two chance that female offspring will also be carriers. In the 
case of carrier daughters, there is a 25 per cent chance that a future grandson will be 
affected. Because of the statistical risk of transmission, selection against unaffected 
(female) carriers of X-linked disorders meets the criteria provided in the Order, and 
may arguably be carried out as an established procedure. 
However, carriers of autosomal recessive disorders will only be burdened by the 
mutation if they reproduce with a partner carrying the same recessive disorder, so 
the risk of an affected pregnancy is much lower. It is unlikely that being a carrier 
of an autosomal recessive disorder would generally be characterised as a serious 
impairment, unless it were open to a subjective assessment. Serious impairment is 
not defined in the HART Order 2005. 
Regardless of whether the transmission of healthy carrier status is categorised as 
causing serious impairment, it is possible that selection against carrier embryos 
may be a legitimate activity in the course of PGD performed to prevent the direct 
transmission of the disorder. It is reasonable to interpret the Order as merely 
providing threshold criteria for accessing PGD, with subsequent selection decisions 
being left to the clinicians and parents involved.
There is a precedent for this type of approach in other similar jurisdictions. In 
the United Kingdom the HFEA’s Code of Practice declares that PGD should only 
be considered where there is a ‘significant risk of a serious genetic condition being 
present in the embryo’.307 However, it is clear that some clinics in the United Kingdom 
have a policy of preferentially transferring unaffected embryos first; and, if there 
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aren’t any, they will then discuss with parents the possibility of implanting carrier 
embryos.308 The HFEA has acknowledged that selection against carrier embryos may 
occur as a result of the PGD process, although it seems there are no formal guidelines 
for practice.
The effect of the current regulatory framework is that if selection against carriers is 
not permitted under the established procedures category, and it is not an expressly 
prohibited activity under the Act, then it is by default a regulated activity. The only 
application of PGD which is expressly prohibited by the HART Act and the Guidelines 
is PGD performed for social reasons.309 As selection against carrier embryos is based 
on a disease-related genotype, it would be inaccurate to consider it to be social 
selection. It is therefore not prohibited, and falls into the regulated category if it is not 
covered by the established procedure Order. A regulated activity may not be carried 
out unless it is carried out in accordance with Guidelines promulgated by ACART.310 
In the absence of Guidelines, the procedure may not be lawfully performed. 
4.3.2.2.2  Primary purpose selection
There is a major distinction between performing PGD to negatively select carrier 
embryos as a primary goal and performing it as a contingent or additional procedure 
to avoid conception of a child who will manifest symptoms of the disease. In the 
latter case the PGD cycle and embryo biopsy is, arguably, a medical imperative 
because the future individual may be directly affected. Embryo biopsy is justified in 
the case of contingent PGD because of the risk of disease transmission; testing for 
carrier status is merely a contingent activity. However with primary purpose carrier 
selection, the only reason for performing PGD is to determine the carrier status of 
otherwise healthy embryos.
The legality of performing PGD with the primary purpose of negatively selecting 
embryos which are healthy carriers of recessive disorders differs according to whether 
the disorder is X-linked or autosomal recessive. PGD carried out for the primary 
purpose of preventing the transmission of carrier status in the case of X-linked 
disorders arguably comes within the established procedures order. In the case of a 
male with haemophilia, his offspring will not be affected, but his daughters will all be 
carriers. Hence, the risk that a future grandson will have the disorder is 25 per cent.311 
This situation meets the criteria in the HART Order 2005, as there is a 25 per cent 
or greater risk of an affected pregnancy and evidence that the future individual may 
be seriously impaired as a result of the disorder. Consequently PGD may arguably be 
performed in the case of X-linked disorders, when the primary purpose is selecting 
against a healthy carrier embryo, as an established procedure. 
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The risk of transmission for autosomal recessive disorders arguably does not meet 
the threshold. Although there is a 50 per cent chance that an individual who is a 
carrier of an autosomal recessive condition will pass on carrier status to offspring, 
the reproductive risk to the future offspring (i.e. the grandchildren) may be less than 
1 per cent. Consequently, the legality of performing PGD as an established procedure 
to detect carrier status of an autosomal disorder as a primary purpose depends upon 
whether carrier status alone is construed as causing serious impairment. 
4.3.3  Summary
Ultimately the current legal position regarding selection against healthy carrier 
embryos in the course of PGD is unclear. A literal interpretation of the established 
procedures Order would suggest that selection against healthy carriers is not 
permissible in the case of autosomal recessive conditions, but is possibly permissible 
for X-linked conditions. However, it is arguable that selection against carrier embryos 
of both autosomal and X-linked conditions may occur at the very least as a contingent 
procedure to ordinary PGD covered by the established procedures Order. According 
to this view, once the threshold for PGD is met selection against carrier embryos may 
be permitted in the case of contingent PGD as an exercise of clinical and parental 
decision-making. 
It is also plausible that selection against X-linked carriers may be legally performed 
as a primary procedure under the established procedures category. Selection against 
healthy carriers of autosomal recessive disorders as a primary procedure is not 
arguable on a literal interpretation of the established procedures Order, because 
of the required 25 per cent or greater risk of an affected pregnancy; unless being a 
carrier of an autosomal recessive disorder constitutes serious impairment in itself. 
This is almost impossible to argue, because the entire population would be seriously 
impaired.
Ultimately there are two distinct questions: first, whether selection against carrier 
embryos is permitted under the current law; and, secondly, if it is not permitted, 
whether it should be. As explained earlier, the answer to the former is not clear-
cut. The following is concerned with the second question and considers whether 
the purpose and principles of the HART Act 2004 support permitting carrier testing 
either as a contingent procedure to ordinary PGD or as a primary purpose.
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.  should carrier testing be permitted? 
This section examines whether selection against carrier embryos should be 
permitted either as a contingent or primary procedure. The framework proposed 
in the second section of this report will be used to consider this question. It starts 
from a presumption of reproductive autonomy and then takes into account the 
relevant principles of the Act. The relevant principles include the provision that the 
health and well-being of children born should be an important consideration in all 
decisions regarding a procedure; the health, safety and dignity of present and future 
generations should be preserved and promoted; and the different ethical, spiritual 
and cultural perspectives in society should be considered and treated with respect. 
The arguments in favour of negative selection of carrier embryos are considered 
first, followed by the arguments against carrier testing. While the arguments against 
carrier testing must be accorded respect, it is argued that they should not displace the 
arguments in favour of reproductive liberty and parental choice.
4.4.1  Arguments in favour of permitting negative selection of healthy carrier embryos
Arguments in favour of permitting selection against carrier embryos may be made on 
the grounds of reproductive liberty or the reproductive interests of the future child. 
They may also be predicated on the grounds of intergenerational benefit. Conversely, 
moral barriers to permitting selection against carrier embryos may be made on the 
grounds that it involves the destruction of healthy embryos, that it is an exercise 
based on genetic essentialism, that it harms society by reducing genetic diversity or 
that it stigmatises healthy carriers.
The standard justification for permitting selection against embryos carrying recessive 
disorders is to prevent carrier offspring from facing the same reproductive issues as 
their parents. The relevant issue is whether there are sufficient reasons or harms to 
restrict prospective parents from selecting against unaffected carrier embryos, either 
contingently to PGD, when it is performed to diagnose a serious disorder, or as a 
stand-alone primary purpose procedure. 
As already discussed, the justification for selecting against unaffected carriers is 
generally based on the reproductive implications for the carriers, not the prospective 
health of the grandchildren or the intergenerational effects. For the vast majority of 
carriers of autosomal recessive conditions, who reproduce with non-carriers, carrier 
status will not be an issue. In addition, carriers will have the same reproductive options 
available to them as currently exist, such as prenatal genetic diagnosis or PGD. Hence 
the means to prevent the transmission of deleterious mutations will be available. 
Yet it is easy to over-simplify the implications of carrier status as simply impacting 
upon reproductive freedom. Not all carrier offspring will engage in reprogenetic 
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technology. They may conceive, carry and deliver affected offspring, whether 
intentionally or not. Not all pregnancies are planned, nor do all those at risk of having 
affected children wish to engage in preventive technology. It is undeniable that raising 
a child with a severe X-linked recessive disorder causes a parent or parents significant 
mental anguish. Hence, selecting against carrier embryos may not be viewed simply 
from the perspective that harm is avoided for the next generation; potential harm 
to subsequent generations is also prevented. A wish to avoid carrier offspring may 
stem from the parents’ desire to prevent a putative child experiencing the guilt of 
passing on a deleterious gene, and consequently suffering significant psychological or 
emotional distress through witnessing the suffering of a child affected by a disorder 
for which they feel responsible. This mental anguish has been vividly described by a 
carrier mother of a son affected by haemophilia in the following statement:
How often do we hear or make the statement, ‘Hemophilia affects males and is 
passed on by females.’ Here lies the seed that grows into that canker called guilt 
which lies heavily on the hearts of many carrier mothers.312
As argued above, the potential reasons for selecting against carrier embryos may 
extend beyond the reproductive interests of future offspring to intergenerational 
considerations. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that exclusion of carrier 
embryos will be a priority for those undertaking PGD to avoid passing on a serious 
single gene disorder. It is unclear whether there will be great demand by prospective 
parents undergoing PGD for the exclusion of healthy carrier embryos. 
A relatively recent Australian study evaluated the social and moral concerns of 
patients presenting for PGD prior to initiating the treatment cycle.313 The study 
group consisted of three patient groups, one group presenting for PGD for single 
gene disorders, another group for aneuploidy screening and a control group who 
were about to commence their first IVF cycle. A questionnaire was administered 
individually and anonymously to each person. One part of the questionnaire dealt 
with issues surrounding selection and transfer of embryos as well as concerns in 
relation to knowledge of the carrier status of the embryo. The following question 
was posed:
If given the choice, would you accept the transfer of an embryo identified as being 
a healthy carrier?
In the group of couples presenting for PGD for single gene disorders, 63 per cent 
answered Yes, compared with only 8 per cent in the group presenting for aneuploidy 
screening and 22 per cent in the control group. The fact that those affected by the 
disorder in question were more willing to have a carrier embryo implanted in the 
hypothetical situation is significant. This may indicate a better understanding of 
carrier status on the part of the group presenting for PGD for single gene disorders. 
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Alternatively, it could mean that those not presenting for PGD for single gene disorders 
either did not understand carrier status or were more concerned not to pass on 
deleterious genes to subsequent generations. The authors of the study observed that: 
Since half the subjects in this group are either asymptotic [sic] carriers themselves 
or have the indicated genetic condition, it is not surprising that they value their 
own genetic status.314 
The majority of subjects (78 per cent) considered that the couple (after consultation 
with the doctor) should decide which embryos should be available for transfer. 
The study was carried out in the Australian state of Victoria. At the time, performing 
PGD for single gene disorders was restricted to selection against affected embryos 
only. This was subject to the exception of female carrier embryos of an X-linked 
disorder in which some disease symptoms could manifest.315 
Earlier studies have questioned whether there will be a wholesale uptake of PGD 
in general. One such study published in 1997 researched the attitudes to PGD of 
245 people who were carriers of recessive disorders and at risk of having affected 
children (as opposed to carrier children). It found that despite support for PGD, 
natural conception followed by prenatal diagnosis remained the treatment of choice. 
Whilst the significant advantages of PGD were acknowledged, they were not sufficient 
to displace the reproductive option of prenatal diagnosis despite the difficulties 
associated with termination.316
A study of approximately half the New Zealand haemophiliac population carried out 
in the mid 1990s found very little enthusiasm even for prenatal testing.317 (PGD does 
not appear to have been discussed in the research, which focused on the options of 
amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling.) This was because of the perceived link 
between a test revealing haemophilia and termination. This reluctance was partly 
based on the idea that ‘you took what you got’, but was also to avoid the expectation 
that termination should follow a positive result.318 Those who underwent prenatal 
testing did so mainly to prepare themselves for what lay ahead.
These studies may only be relevant for the particular period of time during which 
they were conducted. As PGD becomes more established and accessible, and people 
are reassured of the safety of the procedure, it may become a more realistic option for 
those who are at risk of transmitting serious heritable disorders. It has recently been 
reported that between 4 to 6 per cent of IVF carried out in the United States includes 
PGD. However, two-thirds of all cycles in 2005 were for aneuploidy screening.319 
Some points may be extrapolated from the studies discussed. 
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The first is that not all people at risk of transmitting serious disorders will find PGD 
an acceptable option and engage in this technology. The second is that many people 
who are undergoing PGD for single gene disorders will be prepared to have an 
unaffected carrier embryo implanted if given a choice. Sometimes technologies such 
as prenatal diagnosis, which are presented as providing greater options to prospective 
parents, may not be experienced by those people as providing a real choice. In the 
context of prenatal diagnosis and developments in the ability to screen foetuses it has 
been observed that: 
As ‘choices’ become available, they all too rapidly become compulsions to ‘choose’ 
the socially endorsed alternative. In this realm, it is amazing how quickly so-called 
options are transformed into obligations that, in fact, deprive us of choice.320
Accordingly, when considering the issue of unaffected carrier embryos, what is 
regarded as legally permissible must be distinguished from what is morally required. A 
related issue is that carrier status may not always be well understood. A prime example 
of this is a pilot genetic screening project which was carried out in Greece. The aim 
was to identify carriers of the gene that causes sickle cell disease. However, as a result 
of poor understanding, carriers were ‘stigmatised by their community and considered 
ineligible for marriage, except to other carriers’.321 As one commentator noted:
Few, if any of us, would choose to have a child who suffers from a genetic condition, 
but the impact of carrier status, as has already been seen, is poorly understood 
and may lead to the destruction of embryos based on the false belief that in some 
way they are ‘unhealthy’ or ‘defective’. 322 
In Sweden, information is not provided to parents regarding the carrier status of 
embryos, regardless of the seriousness of the condition involved, on the grounds 
that carrier status will not adversely affect the prospective child. This stance seems to 
be predicated on the belief that society should not start selecting against unaffected 
carriers since everyone carries genetic mutations which do not necessarily affect 
them. Therefore ‘there is an unknown risk for everyone that the combination of one’s 
own genes with the genes of another carrier will result in a child with a recessive 
disorder’.323 It has been estimated that each individual person carries between 4 and 
8 recessive deleterious genes.324
Yet, it has been argued that whilst all people are carriers and mostly unaware of the 
array of mutations in their genetic blueprint, this is vastly different from the situation 
where information is available regarding a specific genetic risk which, if it occurs, is 
serious. It is true that a couple who go through PGD will be aware of the possible risk 
that the child may be a carrier, and that the child is free to access that information 
when they wish to do so. However, it has been claimed that ‘in all other areas of life it 
is assumed that one should try to minimise risks and exposure to risk’.325 
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4.4.2  Summary
Attitudes to carrier status amongst the group of individuals affected by autosomal 
disorders or X-linked disorders are not uniform. Not all of those individuals who are 
at risk of transmitting a single gene disorder will access PGD. There is evidence that, 
for some who do, the prime objective is to conceive a healthy child, and carrier status 
does not represent as big an issue as it does for individuals who are not affected by a 
genetic disorder.
Patients who are accessing PGD will generally be well informed regarding the 
implications of the relevant genetic disease, and are well placed to make fully 
informed decisions. Choices regarding negative selection may be construed as being 
motivated by parental concerns regarding the health status of their offspring, or their 
offspring’s future children. Whilst it has been accepted that embryos deserve respect, 
there is no right to implantation or right to life conferred on embryos.
The vast majority of carriers of recessive disorders do not manifest any disease 
symptoms. Whilst X-linked disorders clearly manifest in affected individuals down 
through generations of a family, parents often ‘don’t see the train coming’ in the 
case of an autosomal recessive disorder unless they are affected by the disorder 
themselves, or have been put on notice that they are carriers. Consequently, X-linked 
disorders have extensive intergenerational effects, whilst autosomal disorders have 
more sporadic effects on the population, but an effect nevertheless. 
There are therefore compelling arguments to respect the fully informed and 
autonomous decision of couples wishing to select against their carrier embryos. 
These arguments are based on reproductive liberty which, as argued in section 2, 
is compatible with the first purpose and the principles of the HART Act 2004. The 
principles relating to the health and well-being of the future child and intergenerational 
justice reinforce this view. However, there are also arguments against negative 
selection of carrier embryos, which are addressed in the following section.
.  arguments against negative selection of healthy carrier embryos
Although the HART Act 2004 aims to secure the benefits of assisted reproductive 
procedures, another purpose is to prohibit unacceptable reproductive procedures.326 
There are arguments which may be based on the principles of the Act that militate 
against negative selection of healthy carrier embryos. Concerns have been raised 
about the health and well-being of the future child and intergenerational justice. 
There are also ethical and spiritual arguments against carrier testing which, in terms 
of section 4(g) of the Act, must be considered and treated with respect. 
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4.5.1  Health and well-being of the future child and intergenerational justice
Concerns have been raised that reproductive decisions may have unpredictable effects 
on future generations and genetic diversity. For example, it is possible that carrying a 
recessively inherited genetic mutation may convey some kind of biological advantage 
that is not yet fully understood. An example of this is the link between sickle cell 
disease and increased malaria protection.327 Both those affected and unaffected 
carriers of sickle cell disease have a resistance to malaria. It has been established that 
both sufferers and heterozygote carriers of cystic fibrosis may have a resistance to 
tuberculosis and/or secretory diarrhoea.328 Conversely, evidence also suggests that 
heterozygote carriers of cystic fibrosis may be prone to other disorders associated 
with cystic fibrosis, such as disseminated bronchiectasis.329 The United Kingdom 
Human Genetic Commission concluded in its recent report, Making Babies, that: 
… these remote possible effects seem impoverished reasons not to… make carrier 
screening for certain conditions available for those that want it.330
The fact that being a heterozygote carrier of some diseases may confer some kind of 
selective benefit may provide some truth to the old idiom ‘better the devil you know 
than the devil you don’t’. Conversely, it may not be sufficient to preclude screening 
for those who wish to use it.
4.5.2  Moral status of the embryo 
The fact that more embryos will be wasted if unaffected carrier embryos are deselected 
triggers concerns in relation to the moral status of the embryos. Parents may embark 
on additional PGD cycles when previously biopsied, unaffected carrier embryos 
could have been utilised or cryopreserved. Negatively selecting carriers of autosomal 
recessive conditions is arguably more morally weighty than selecting against carriers 
of X-linked recessive disorders because of the comparative risks involved. However, 
the gradualist position,331 which accords an embryo special, but limited, status, may 
not be sufficient on its own to preclude parents from having a choice in the case of 
carriers of recessive conditions. 
4.5.3  Genetic essentialism
The term ‘geneticisation’332 describes the potential for genetics to ‘fundamentally 
alter how we view ourselves and others’.333 The downstream effect of such a view is 
the adoption by society of an essentialist view, which reduces a person to their genes, 
awaking a new ‘eugenic ethos’.334 
Because the success of PGD depends on producing surplus embryos it may seem 
intuitive or obvious to choose to implant the carrier-free ones and destroy the others, 
rather than the reverse. Alternatively, to destroy an embryo on the grounds that it is 
a carrier – rather than a sufferer – of an hereditary condition may ‘smack more of 
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social experimentation than good medicine’.335 It is plausible that permitting negative 
selection against carriers may start a form of ‘selection creep’ – that is, negative 
selection of carriers may become an expectation rather than a choice. As previously 
observed, what is legally permissible in this context should not be morally required, 
but should be a matter of personal conscience.
The rationale for permitting negative selection and subsequent destruction of 
embryos which are unaffected by a serious disorder but are carriers of a serious 
genetic disorder must be based on the philosophy underpinning the HART Act 2004. 
Whilst one of the purposes of the Act is to secure the benefits of assisted reproductive 
procedures, another is to prohibit unacceptable assisted reproductive procedures. 
The ultimate question is whether the harm associated with permitting parental 
choice is sufficient to prohibit the reproductive liberty of parents to choose in these 
circumstances. 
4.5.4  Embryo morphology and resource implications
In the course of ordinary IVF, an embryologist selects the embryo(s) for transfer 
with characteristics indicating the greatest chance of successful implantation and 
pregnancy.336 In the case of IVF with PGD, additional criteria apply because of the 
affected embryos. A preference for selection against both affected and healthy carrier 
embryos will reduce the number of embryos available for transfer. 
When an embryo is at risk of inheriting an autosomal recessive condition there is 
only a one in four chance of having an implantable embryo if unaffected carrier 
embryos are excluded as suitable for transfer. The chances are one in two in the case 
of a female carrier of an X-linked disorder. The reduction in available embryos has 
significant resource implications, as more PGD cycles may be required.
A recent study was undertaken in Australia to determine the average and age-specific 
cost per live birth for all IVF treatment cycles carried out in Australia in the year 
2002. The average health care cost per live birth event was AUD$32,903.337 
For publicly funded treatment, choosing a less optimal embryo for transfer (i.e. an 
unaffected embryo which appears to have a lower chance of successful implantation 
than an unaffected carrier embryo) increases the potential costs and reduces the 
chance of successful pregnancy and birth. This must be balanced against competing 
national health care demands. If couples are accessing public funds, this may be a very 
real factor in decision making for both parents and clinicians. Permitting selection 
against carrier embryos of rare recessive conditions, with negligible risk to a carrier’s 
children, is not easily justified when resources are limited. In private contexts, this 
may be less of an issue where parents are able, and willing, to pay for extra cycles.
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4.5.5  Summary
Under the HART Act 2004, the different perspectives held by society must be 
considered and treated with respect when contemplating issues regarding PGD. The 
arguments raised against the negative selection of carrier embryos are not sufficient 
to displace the arguments in favour of parental choice and clinical judgment. Eugenic 
concerns could be borne out if it became a requirement that carrier embryos were 
to be discarded. However, giving couples a choice in the context of their own 
circumstances does not constitute eugenics. Arguments based on genetic diversity 
are, in some instances, speculative, and do not constitute a sufficient risk to the 
population as a whole to limit individual choices. Embryo morphology and resource 
implications are factors. They may impose some limits as a matter of practice, but 
they do not discount negative selection as a matter of principle. It would seem to be 
a matter best judged by the clinician and the individual couple involved according to 
the circumstances. 
.  other jurisdictions
Whilst policy must be determined in New Zealand in the light of the HART Act 2004, 
it is useful to look to other jurisdictions which have considered this issue. 
4.6.1  United Kingdom
When PGD was first carried out in the United Kingdom, the decisions regarding 
carrier embryos resided with the patient in consultation with the clinical team. In 
1999 the HFEA and what was then the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing 
undertook a public consultation on PGD. The public was invited to make comments 
on the general issue of replacing carrier embryos.338 The joint working party, which 
after the reconstitution of the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing as the Human 
Genetics Commission (HGC) became a HFEA and HGC collaboration, endorsed the 
following view in their recommendations:
… in the case of chromosomal re-arrangements or autosomal recessive conditions, 
if it is possible to exclude affected embryos without discovering the carrier status 
of others and without compromising the accuracy of the test, then this is to be 
preferred.339
X-linked recessive disorders were not included in this recommendation, which 
presumably suggests that selection against carriers of X-linked conditions is 
acceptable. The recommendation is arguably an unhelpful prevarication. The 
development of the capacity to test for more disorders and to determine carrier 
status means that tests will often reveal whether an embryo is an unaffected carrier. 
The HGC addressed the issue of selecting against carrier embryos three years later in 
its public consultation, Choosing the Future. It set out the following views but did not 
commit to a position on the issue:
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Some would argue that people should generally be given a choice to use artificial 
reproductive technologies as they feel appropriate as long as it does not harm that 
child. Others argue that using these technologies undervalues the life of the child 
born. For example, if a couple is using PGD for a condition like cystic fibrosis and 
there may be a choice between embryos with cystic fibrosis, healthy carriers, and 
embryos which neither have the genetic disorder nor are carriers, then parents 
should have the option to implant the embryo without the condition or carrier 
status. On the other hand, some argue that in some situations, carriers of cystic 
fibrosis may have a genetic advantage because of resistance to certain diseases. It 
could certainly be suggested that we should not exclude such genetic variation 
from human populations. It does mean that there is a risk for the next generation 
that if the person who is a carrier has a child with another carrier, they will run 
the risk of having a child with cystic fibrosis.340
The HGC observed in its report, Making Babies, that some couples undergoing PGD 
would prefer to avoid having a child who is a carrier, even if that child could be 
expected to be healthy, because they wished to protect their child from the risk of 
having affected children when they reproduce. Others felt, however, that the exclusion 
of a healthy embryo purely on the basis of its carrier status was unreasonable, and 
it may also significantly reduce the chances of achieving a successful pregnancy. The 
HGC concluded with the following:
if there are several embryos from which a selection can be made to maximise the 
chance of achieving a healthy pregnancy and minimise the risk of misdiagnosis, 
there may be a hierarchy of preference in which unaffected embryos that look 
healthy are scored higher than embryos that are carriers or look less likely to 
implant successfully. We suggest that in situations where PGD is being used, and 
where there are both carrier and unaffected embryos of equal quality, parents 
should be able to request which they prefer to be implanted. 341
The HGC recommendation is slightly ambiguous. On the one hand it appears to 
be indicating that unaffected embryos may be scored more highly than unaffected 
carrier embryos of equivalent morphology and seems to equate carrier embryos 
with embryos of poor quality. What is apparent is that a non-directive approach 
is being utilised, which permits flexibility at the coal-face. It is of course possible 
that the embryo which has the best morphological features overall (the best chance 
of implanting) will be an unaffected carrier. The decision as to which to implant 
becomes more complicated when choosing against a carrier embryo may also reduce 
the chances of successful implantation and pregnancy. 
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4.6.2  Australia
Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia have introduced legislation which 
regulates assisted reproductive technology services, but only Victoria and Western 
Australia specifically address the issue of carrier embryos.
4.6.2.1  Victoria
The Infertility Treatment Authority (ITA) of Victoria has adopted the view that 
applications of PGD for genetic testing must be guided by the current practice of 
prenatal diagnosis and the Policies of the Human Genetics Society of Australia. 
However, an important qualification has been made to this statement. The ITA has 
specifically stated that there might be a greater range of indications where PGD may 
be considered, such as selection against carrier embryos.342 
The ITA has expressly acknowledged that, in terms of selecting against carrier embryos, 
there is a significant difference between carrier status for X-linked conditions and 
autosomal recessive conditions.343 The most recent ITA policy provides that selection 
against carrier embryos of X-linked disorders, which have already been tested for and 
which appear on list B of the schedule of approved genetic testing, is permitted as 
a matter of course – no application to the Authority is required.344 However, where 
it is proposed to identify and select against carrier embryos of autosomal recessive 
conditions, in addition to testing for the condition in question, an application must 
be made to the Authority.345 The Authority determines each application on a case-by-
case basis and decides whether or not the application should progress to the relevant 
Ethics Committee for approval.
4.6.2.2  Western Australia
As a result of amendments to the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) 
PGD is permitted in Western Australia, but all diagnostic procedures carried out on 
an embryo must have the prior approval of the Reproductive Technology Council. 
The Act provides that approval may only be given if there is ‘a significant risk of a 
serious genetic abnormality or disease being present in the embryo’.346 When deciding 
whether to approve an embryo diagnostic procedure, the Council is required to 
consider the risk and severity of the condition that is to be tested for and the safety 
and reliability of the procedure.
Couples undergoing PGD may indicate their preferred clinical course of action: 
the implantation of healthy carrier embryos; preferential implantation of healthy 
non-carrier embryos; or negative selection of healthy carrier embryos prior to the 
performance of PGD. In the case of autosomal recessive conditions, if they are 
considering implanting only non-carriers, or preferentially implanting non-carriers, 
parents should be informed of the low risk of inheritance to the second and future 
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generation.347 Consequently, they may either request that unaffected carriers are 
not transferred, or that they would accept the transfer of healthy carriers in certain 
circumstances. 
However, if they elect to permit the transfer of healthy carriers, along with unaffected 
embryos, they are not informed of the carrier status of the embryo subsequently 
transferred. The purpose of this restriction is to comply with the policy on predictive 
genetic testing of children formulated by the Human Genetics Society of Australia. 
This policy does not expressly refer to testing for carrier status, but the principles 
in regard to predictive testing seem to have been extrapolated to carrier testing in 
minors.348 The Human Genetics Society of Australia recommendation is made on the 
grounds that there are no proven health benefits for a child in knowing their genetic 
status, and that it is preferable that individuals are given the opportunity to make 
autonomous decisions regarding genetic testing.349 Importantly, whilst parents are 
given a choice in relation to the transfer of unaffected carrier embryos, they are not 
permitted to access that information.
There are exceptions to this policy. In advice given to clinics the Council has observed 
that ‘there may be circumstances where it would be appropriate to provide information 
to participants about the carrier status of tested embryos, with the approval of the 
Council, particularly where a carrier may be symptomatic for the disease state’.350 In 
these circumstances, a request for approval to disclose information about the carrier 
status to participants is required when applying for approval to perform PGD.351 
In the case of primary purpose PGD, where a person wishes to access PGD but there 
is no chance of having affected offspring, such as the case of a male with an X-linked 
recessive condition, approval is predicated upon whether the condition would have a 
serious effect on a carrier embryo.352 
The Australian Health Ethics Committee, a principal committee of the Australian 
National Health and Medical Research Council, has promulgated the Ethical Guidelines 
on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research. These 
guidelines provide generic advice, and do not expressly address the issue of healthy 
carrier embryos. The guidelines state that, pending further community discussion, 
PGD must not be used for the ‘prevention of conditions that do not seriously harm 
the person to be born’. 353
4.6.3  Netherlands
A recent report released by the Health Council of the Netherlands (an independent 
advisory body charged with providing Ministers and Parliament with scientific 
advice on public health matters) addressed the acceptability of the negative selection 
of unaffected carrier embryos.354 PGD is permitted in the Netherlands where there 
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is an elevated individual risk that the child will have a severe abnormality. The 
Health Council advised that, where parents who are undertaking PGD to prevent the 
transmission of a serious genetic disorder request selection against carrier embryos, 
there is little reason not to comply with their request. However, it also advised that 
selection against carriers is only acceptable if being a carrier presents serious problems, 
such as in the case of X-linked Duchenne muscular dystrophy. The Secretary of State 
endorsed the position of the Health Council, stating that selection against carrier 
embryos could only occur when PGD was indicated to prevent the transmission of a 
severe genetic disorder.355 
4.6.4  European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology356
In 2003, the ESHRE Taskforce opined that the fundamental argument for not 
replacing carrier embryos is not based on eugenic considerations, but rather on 
the wish to spare offspring from the burden of similar reproductive decisions.357 It 
asserted that, if there are both carriers and non-carriers available, the non-carriers 
should be replaced first and the carriers cryopreserved. The Taskforce recommended 
that the transfer of carrier embryos be discussed with patients prior to the initiation 
of the PGD cycle, particularly in the case of X-linked diseases. According to the 
ESHRE Taskforce, the ultimate decision as to whether or not carrier embryos are 
replaced resides with the parents.
ESHRE subsequently released its ‘Best Practice Guideline for PGD and PGS’ in 
2005.358 It recommended that embryo selection criteria for PGD procedures be based 
primarily on unaffected diagnosis and secondarily favourable embryo morphology.359 
The guidelines declare that transfer of carrier embryos (of an autosomal recessive 
disorder), or possibly carrier female embryos (of an X-linked disorder), is acceptable 
since adverse health consequences to the resulting child are unlikely. However, 
occasionally carriers of genetic conditions, in particular X-linked disorders, may 
manifest milder forms of the disease. Each case requires careful evaluation and 
informed discussion with the couple. 
.7  Possible regulatory responses
As discussed, the magnitude of reproductive risks for carrier embryos in the case 
of autosomal recessive disorders differs greatly from those for X-linked recessive 
disorders. Because of this, at least one commentator has advocated that guidelines 
should differentiate between these different types of heritable disorders.360 
Guido de Wert has identified three possible policies in relation to the issue of healthy 
carrier embryos diagnosed in the course of carrying out PGD for a serious genetic 
disorder. He cogently argues that a differentiated policy for carriers of X-linked 
conditions compared to carriers of autosomal recessive conditions is required because 
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of the very low risk that a future carrier of an autosomal recessive condition will 
face similar reproductive problems. This consequently makes it disproportionate to 
categorically discard healthy embryos in the case of unaffected carriers of autosomal 
recessive disease. The three possible policies are summarised in Table 3.361
 action Pros cons
1 Ignore carrier status:  Embryo with best chance Some offspring will face
Non-selectively transfer of implantation similar reproductive 
all healthy embryos  transferred challenges as parents
including carriers 
according to best Carriers grow into  Some offspring may
morphology healthy children, adults have affected children 
 We are all carriers of 
 recessive disorders
 Avoids stigmatising 
 carriers
2 Refrain from Prevents future Healthy carrier embryos 
transferring carrier reproductive dilemmas wasted 
embryos 
 Prevents intergenerational May be disproportionate 
 transmission to categorically discard   
  carriers of autosomal   
  recessive conditions in   
  view of low risk to next  
  generation; more   
  relevant for X-linked   
  recessive disorders
  
  Potentially stigmatises   
  other healthy carriers
3 Preferential selection: Avoids wastage of healthy Still ascribes to idea that
 embryos in subsequent non-carrier embryos are
Transfer healthy  IVF cycles just because ‘preferable’ to carriers
non-carrier embryos first,  embryos are carriers
then carrier embryos in 
subsequent cycles 
Table 3: Possible regulatory responses
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The third option prioritises the transfer of non-carrier embryos over carrier embryos. 
This may appear to be a reasonable strategy in relation to carriers of autosomal 
recessive disorders, but it is also problematic. At best, it avoids the destruction of 
embryos and possibly avoids further IVF cycles; but it still has as its central premise 
the notion that transfer of healthy carriers is a second-tier option. In addition, it does 
not accord weight to the fact that morphology is the most significant predictor of 
successful implantation and pregnancy. At least one PGD centre has adopted a policy 
that prioritises good morphology over carrier status.362 
4.7.1  Contingent selection
If there is a risk of transmitting an X-linked condition, and prospective parents do not 
wish to implant unaffected carrier offspring, then the second category has merit. 
4.7.2  Primary purpose selection
As discussed, it is possible that there may be a demand for PGD to select against 
unaffected carrier offspring as the sole purpose. Reportedly some male haemophiliac 
patients prefer to conceive only boys, as the sons will not be affected by the condition, 
whilst all daughters will be unaffected (usually) carriers of haemophilia and have a 50 
per cent risk of passing the disorder on to their sons.363 
It has been argued that it is difficult to maintain a distinction between permitting 
parents to select against carrier embryos, when it is contingent upon PGD to prevent 
the transmission of a serious X-linked genetic disorder, and PGD in which the 
primary purpose is to select against a carrier embryo of an X-linked condition.364 Yet, 
arguably, embryo biopsy is justified in the case of contingent PGD as all the embryos 
are already biopsied. Testing for carrier status is a contingent activity. 
In contrast when selection against female carriers of the haemophilia gene is proposed 
as the primary purpose, it is not performed to prevent the direct transmission of 
a serious genetic disorder. It is to eliminate a future adult’s potential psychological 
distress and reproductive dilemma regarding transmission of the disease. 
Section 4(b) of the Act provides the guiding principle that the human health, safety 
and dignity of present and future generations should be preserved and promoted. It 
could be argued that a health benefit accrues in permitting PGD to be performed for 
the sole purpose of deselecting heterozygote carriers: a benefit that is intergenerational. 
Arguably, parents who are sufficiently concerned to prevent the transmission of the 
particular gene to undertake PGD in the first place will benefit psychologically from 
having lawful access to it. Whether this is perceived to be an acceptable use of PGD 
or to warrant prohibition depends on whether parental reasons for engaging in PGD 
(effectively because of the reproductive and psychological risk to the future child) 
are perceived to be proportionate to the wastage of healthy female carrier embryos, 
and the perpetuation of the idea that heterozygote carriers are undesirable. It may 
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be perceived by many as advancing towards selection which is not based on direct 
medical benefit. 
Yet, as observed in the first section, it is possible to wish to avoid transmission of a 
genetic mutation, without seeking to discriminate against others with the mutation. 
Indeed, those seeking primary PGD will either be males affected by an X-linked 
disorder, or individuals who are autosomal recessive carriers themselves. 
Although current data suggest that the risk of harm to the prospective child born 
as a result of PGD is no greater than that of routine IVF or intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection (a fertilisation procedure), there may (or may not) be longer-term effects 
that manifest in the future. It should also be acknowledged that IVF and PGD carry 
small attendant risks to both the mother and prospective child. The strength of 
the argument for the procedure to be permitted is diminished in the case of IVF 
and PGD carried out in circumstances where there is no infertility, and no risk of 
the immediate offspring inheriting the disease. This creates a distinction between 
selection against unaffected carriers contingent to PGD, and when it is the primary 
purpose for performing PGD. However, the ultimate issue is whether these are 
sufficient reasons to prohibit primary purpose PGD; or whether these reasons merely 
indicate that it would be extremely rare for an individual to undertake the procedure, 
and that many providers may be reluctant to perform it. Arguably, there appears to 
be little justification for prohibiting a fully informed couple from undergoing the 
procedure, apart from the risks involved in IVF and PGD.
.  conclusion
As reprogenetic technology develops it offers new possibilities. Among these 
developments is the expansion in the number of genetic disorders which may be 
detected by PGD, and an increased ability to determine the carrier status of embryos. 
As a result of the IVF and PGD process, it is likely that several embryos will be 
diagnosed as unaffected or unaffected carriers. It is a valid concern that the threshold 
for selection of embryos will be significantly lowered as a result of these factors. 
Methods that would avoid the dilemmas in relation to carrier embryos include 
employing tests that do not identify carrier status if available. This is simply not 
possible for many tests, such as sickle cell disease. Refusing to disclose carrier status is 
another option; but this is contrary to the ethos of fully informed health consumers. 
The reality is that, in the course of PGD procedures, carrier status may be determined 
and parents may want to know. 
Selecting against heterozygote carrier embryos is problematic because negative 
selection is not based on a genetic trait that has deleterious effects on the physical 
health of a child that will be born. Rather, it is based on a genetic trait that imposes, 
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or may impose, a psychological and reproductive burden on the future individual, 
and may pose a risk to subsequent generations. The desire to select against a carrier 
embryo may seem to be a disproportionate response where there is no physical risk to 
the future individual; and, in particular, where the embryo is an unaffected carrier of 
an autosomal recessive mutation. Everyone carries within their own genetic blueprint 
numerous recessive mutations, which will not manifest in affected offspring unless a 
child is conceived with a person with the same autosomal recessive mutation. The issue 
is whether these concerns are sufficient to displace the presumption of reproductive 
liberty and the interests of those who wish to select against carrier embryos. 
It has been argued that permitting selection against carrier embryos may be justified on 
the grounds of reproductive liberty and the reproductive and psychological interests of 
the future child. It may also be predicated on the grounds of intergenerational benefit. 
Arguments against allowing negative selection of carrier embryos have been made on 
the grounds that it involves the destruction of healthy embryos; it is an exercise based 
on genetic essentialism; it harms society, by reducing genetic diversity; and it potentially 
stigmatises healthy carriers. Selection against carrier embryos also potentially reduces 
the success of a PGD cycle, and has resulting resource implications.
It is unclear whether permitting parents a choice in relation to the negative selection 
of unaffected carrier embryos of single gene disorders will open the floodgates for this 
particular type of selection. One small study has indicated that, of all groups presenting 
for IVF, couples presenting for IVF with PGD for single gene disorders were least 
concerned with the possible transfer of an embryo which was an unaffected carrier of 
a recessive disorder.365 In addition, the person undergoing PGD who requests selection 
against carrier embryos may be in the best position to determine the personal impact 
of being a carrier of the particular genetic mutation at hand. It is difficult to maintain 
rigid restrictions in this context in the face of current abortion law. 
Prenatal diagnosis is often used as a benchmark for determining the permissible 
limits of PGD. An abortion during the first twenty weeks of gestation is rendered 
lawful where there is a substantial risk that a child, if born, will be severely physically 
or mentally handicapped.366 It is extremely unlikely that an abortion on the grounds 
that the foetus is a carrier of an X-linked or autosomal recessive disorder would meet 
this requirement. However, an abortion is also lawful if continuing the pregnancy 
would result in serious danger to the life, or the physical or mental health, of the 
woman.367 Terminations on the basis of mental health accounted for approximately 
98.7 per cent of abortions in New Zealand in the year 2003.368 Clearly access to 
termination on mental health grounds, at least in the first trimester, is permitted 
relatively liberally in New Zealand. In addition, given the significant difference in 
moral status between a three to five-day-old embryo and a foetus, a wider range of 
selection is morally acceptable. 
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With the introduction of the regulatory framework for PGD in New Zealand, it 
has been accepted that parents have the right to avoid the birth of a child with a 
serious genetic disorder. The question is whether that extends to unaffected carriers 
of serious genetic disorders. On a literal interpretation of the HART Order 2005, it is 
at least arguable that negative selection against carrier embryos of X-linked disorders 
is permitted both as a contingent or primary purpose procedure; but it is much more 
difficult to argue for this approach in the case of autosomal recessive disorders. It 
is possible that negative selection against carrier embryos, in the course of PGD 
covered under the HART Order 2005, will be deemed permissible by ACART. This 
leaves open the question of whether selection against carrier embryos as a primary 
purpose should be permitted. It has been argued that the purposes and principles of 
the HART Act 2004 are broad enough to permit carrier testing and negative selection 
both as a contingent procedure to PGD and as the primary purpose of testing in 
the case of X-linked disorders. However, negative selection of carrier embryos of 
autosomal recessive conditions as a primary purpose is very difficult to justify.
It has been argued that the decision as to which embryos are selected for transplantation 
should be a matter for the couple and clinicians to decide. This is consistent with the 
first purpose and principles of the HART Act 2004. However, it should not become a 
matter of routine clinical practice that carrier embryos are systematically discarded. 
Rather, it should be a combined decision made with full information provided.
Negative selection of carrier embryos has been recently considered by various 
jurisdictions. Carriers of certain X-linked conditions may be selected against 
contingent to PGD in the State of Victoria, Australia, and approval for selection 
against carriers of autosomal recessive conditions is made on a case-by-case basis. 
Western Australia permits prospective parents to indicate how they wish to deal 
with the issue of carrier embryos prior to undergoing a treatment cycle; but they 
are not informed of the carrier status of embryos that are implanted.  The Western 
Australia  Reproductive Technology Council will consider applications for primary 
purpose PGD, but is required to consider whether the condition will have a serious 
effect on the carrier embryo. In the Netherlands carriers of serious genetic conditions 
may be selected against in the course of PGD where being a carrier presents serious 
problems. In contrast, Sweden does not permit selection on the basis of carrier status, 
nor are parents informed of carrier status. The United Kingdom generally leaves the 
decision to the parents and clinicians involved.
Arguments against negative selection of carriers based on genetic diversity are not 
strong. This is particularly so, given that, although PGD will become more utilised in 
the future, only 3 per cent of serious disorders are single gene disorders, and not all of 
those at risk of transmitting a serious single gene disorder will access the technology. 
Considering reproductive risks, and applying a gradualist approach to the moral 
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status of the embryo, it is much harder to justify the negative selection of unaffected 
carriers of autosomal recessive conditions than X-linked conditions. Whilst there 
might be hesitation in the case of negative selection of healthy carriers of autosomal 
conditions, it is difficult to see on what basis parents should be prohibited from 
making this choice. 
Taken together, the harms raised are not sufficient to displace the presumption of 
reproductive liberty in this context. Although the implications of transferring a carrier 
embryo may seem, to some people at least, to be benign, this is not sufficient reason 
to justify a State-imposed prohibition. It is possible that the greatest societal harm 
may be seen in prospective parents who are insufficiently informed, or who feel that 
they do not have a ‘real’ choice but to reject a carrier embryo. Whilst it is inevitable 
that consideration of resources must be taken into account, this consideration should 
be a matter for clinical and parental judgment, rather than a reason for outright 
prohibition.
.9  summary of conclusions
4.9.1  Carrier selection contingent to PGD for serious genetic impairment
1 Parents should be informed that embryo quality/morphology is the best 
predictor of successful implantation and pregnancy.
2 Carrier embryos of X-linked disorders (which may or may not cause phenotypic 
manifestations) come within the scope of the HART Order 2005 and may be 
lawfully selected against as an established procedure.
3 Permitting selection against unaffected female carrier embryos of serious 
X-linked disorders is arguably permitted under the HART Order 2005 and is 
morally justified because female carrier offspring will have a high risk of having 
affected children (i.e. there is a 25 per cent risk that a couple undergoing PGD 
will have an affected grandchild).
4 Negative selection of unaffected carriers of autosomal recessive conditions 
should be distinguished because of the low reproductive risk. Ultimately, 
selection against carriers of autosomal recessive conditions should be a matter 
for the parents and provider. 
Decisions must be made subject to the following information:
 a. prospective parents must be sufficiently informed regarding the    
 reproductive risk for autosomal recessive carriers; 
 b. prospective parents must be sufficiently informed that the number of   
 available transferable embryos will be reduced; 
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 c. prospective parents must be appraised of the fact that everyone carries   
 recessive mutations;
 d. the particular significance of carrying an autosomal recessive condition if   
 the individual is in a high-risk ethnic group should be taken into account   
 (e.g. cystic fibrosis in persons of European descent, sickle cell disease in   
 persons of African descent).
4.9.2  Carrier selection as primary purpose
1 This is justified where males affected by X-linked conditions wish to avoid 
producing carrier daughters (i.e. there is a 25 per cent risk that a haemophiliac 
male will have an affected grandson).
2 It is more difficult to justify for autosomal recessive conditions, given 
the invasiveness of the procedure, the risks of the procedure and the low 
reproductive risk to offspring and, consequently, low value of screening.
  uPDate: PreimPlantation genetic haPlotyPing (Pgh)
Recent technological advances in PGD have considerable implications for the 
future use of PGD. The application of PGH has signalled a major transition in 
the performance of PGD. The first birth (twins) resulting from PGH was recently 
reported in the United Kingdom.369 The parents underwent PGH as they were both 
carriers of a cystic fibrosis mutation. The couple already had twins, one of whom had 
cystic fibrosis. 
To understand the procedure of haplotyping, it is necessary to review some basic 
concepts of genetics. Genes consist of defined sequences of DNA which provide 
instructions for making protein. While each chromosome pair contains the same 
genes, the gene sequences may not be identical. Individual gene copies exist as variant 
in a population and often differ from each other by small changes in the DNA base 
sequence. These variants are termed ‘alleles’, and arise as a result of mutation. Whilst 
some mutations are harmful, others simply provide variation such as freckled skin.370 
Hence DNA sequences vary among individuals, yet do not necessarily change the 
phenotype or health of a person. It is possible to distinguish sequence variants that are 
inherited from a person’s mother or father; these are the maternal and paternal alleles.
‘Polymorphism’ is a generic term, which includes disease causing and non-disease 
causing variants, and variants that have no appreciable effect at all. A polymorphism 
is a variation in DNA sequence that occurs in 1 per cent or more of the population.371 
The single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) is the most common polymorphism 
in the human genome.372 More than three million SNPs have been identified by 
researchers.373 SNPs occur when a single nucleotide in the DNA (A, G, C or T) differs 
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from the most common nucleotide at that position. Because human cells are diploid, 
that is they contain two sets of chromosomes, a person can have one of several 
genotypes. At any chosen SNP an individual may either be homozygous for the major 
allele, heterozygous, or homozygous for a minor allele.374
Ova or sperm are produced in the reproductive cells, termed ‘germ cells’. In a 
process during meiosis called recombination, maternal and paternal chromosomes 
contained in germ cells pair up and exchange segments of DNA.375 The result of 
recombination is that the chromosomes in the ova or sperm contain a mixture of 
alleles from each parent of an individual. Groups of alleles are known as haplotypes 
and are rarely separated by recombination. Haplotypes are defined as ‘a combination 
of alleles at different markers along the same chromosome that are inherited as a 
unit’.376 In the human genome, haplotypes may contain up to sixty SNPs that travel as 
a group.377 Essentially, at any given section of a chromosome each individual has two 
haplotypes. One represents the maternal and the other the paternal chromosomes.378 
Consequently: 
A new mutation responsible for a genetic disease always enters the population 
within an existing haplotype, which is termed the ancestral haplotype.
Over several generations, recombination events may occur within the haplotype 
but the disease allele and the closest SNPs still tend to be inherited as a group. 
If this haplotype can be identified in a group of patients with the disease, typing 
the alleles within the haplotype allows a conserved region to be identified, which 
pinpoints the mutation responsible for the disease.379
When family members are tested for ‘multiple polymorphic markers that lie within 
a disease gene and/or which closely flank it’, the high-risk, potentially mutation-
carrying haplotype(s) (inherited by the affected person) and the low-risk haplotypes 
may be identified.380 This enables the molecular geneticist to determine the genetic 
status of embryos for that family. Figure 2 illustrates this process.
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Figure 2: Haplotype mapping 
Figure sourced from ‘The Human Genome: Haplotype Mapping’
Available at http://genome.wellcome.ac.uk/doc%5Fwtd020781.html viewed 3 August 2006
a new mutation (X) arises in the proximity of six single nucleotide polymorphisms, 
with the ancestral haplotype signature TaTcaT. over several generations, the 
haplotype signature may be eroded by recombination. For example, contemporary 
haplotype 1 was produced by recombination between the first and second SnPs. 
The new alleles are shown in pink. However, the smallest conserved haplotype 
signature in all patients carrying the disease allele places the disease between 
SnPs 3 and 4. This technique provides a candidate region of about 10,000 bp, 
which is smaller than most human genes.
PGH has been described as a ‘paradigm shift’ for embryo diagnosis.381 Traditional 
PGD for single gene defects requires the development of family-specific single cell 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) mutation tests.382 In addition to the potentially 
lengthy time required to design and optimise single cell PCR multiplex reactions, to 
minimise allele drop out, reportedly PCR testing may not be performed in proximity 
to other DNA diagnostic work because of the risk of contamination.383 The effect of 
these limitations is that few laboratories provide PGD services. Where testing is carried 
out, usually only a small number of disease tests are offered by any one centre.384 
PGH requires analysis of pedigree. There must be at least one affected individual in 
a family or enough unaffected members to permit conclusive identification of the 
high and low risk haplotypes.385 One of the main advantages of PGH over direct 
mutation analysis is that ‘the same test can be used for all families even when there is 
heterogeneity in the pathogenic mutations’.386 Significantly, testing is not only limited 
to common mutations, but can even be applied when the causative mutation has not 
12
been identified.387 Hence, any family with a mapped single gene disorder may access 
preimplantation testing. 
In the case of X-linked diseases where there is no specific test available for the 
particular mutation, PGD is employed to sex select against male embryos. In contrast, 
PGH enables the identification of normal males by identifying high and low risk 
haplotypes in embryos, which increases the number of embryos available for biopsy 
and possible transfer. PGH provides information as to whether a female embryo is 
a carrier of the high-risk haplotype, and therefore whether or not it is an unaffected 
carrier embryo. 
Consequently, PGH has the potential significantly to increase the number of single 
gene disorders that may be tested for and, in the case of some X-linked disorders, to 
increase the number of embryos available for transfer by identifying unaffected male 
embryos. It is anticipated that the uptake of PGH will reduce waiting times for the 
creation of new tests for specific disorders.
This analysis is current up to March 2007.
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